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CRIME OR PUNISHMENT: THE
PARENTAL CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
DEFENSE-REASONABLE AND
NECESSARY, OR EXCUSED ABUSE?
Kandice K. Johnson*
The parental right to use physical force to discipline and re-
strain children is a privilege firmly rooted in the American system
of jurisprudence. This privilege is often asserted as a defense when
parents are charged with a crime of aggression against their child.
While the privilege to use disciplinary force is universally recog-
nized as a defense in criminal actions, it is equally acknowledged
that child abuse is a pervasive reality of American life. This article
postulates that current laws, addressing assertion of the parental
privilege defense in criminal actions, fail either to provide adequate
guidance to parents or to sufficiently protect children from abuse.
Professor Johnson proposes a justification statute that would
place parental conduct that results in physical injury to the child
outside of the parental defense umbrella. The goal of the statute is
to preserve the parental privilege to use disciplinary force while
simultaneously providing a clear statement that the physical integ-
rity of children is sacrosanct.
I. INTRODUCTION
Raising children has never been easy. Indeed, it can be argued
that no matter the time or place, humanity's most fundamental chal-
lenge comes not in the global arena, but rather in the day-to-day pro-
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cess of protecting and shaping our young. It is unlikely that Mary
Conner would have disputed this premise.'
In mid-nineteenth century England, Mary Conner, a widow,
worked to support her children as a street vendor selling fruit.2 When
she returned from what must have been a long and exhausting work
day, she expected her eldest to pay heed to her instructions and begin
the family meal before her arrival.' On the evening in question, Mary
was obviously angry with her fourteen-year-old son's failure to follow
this directive and with his impertinent response to her request-fac-
tors that explain why Mary picked up and threw a fire poker and why
the boy ran from the room.4
The escalation of what began as an all-too-familiar parent/child
scenario tragically took an unexpected turn when Mary's five-year-old
child was fatally struck by the poker that had been aimed at her eldest
child.5 In the course of upholding Mary's manslaughter conviction,6
the court alluded to the fact that her conduct constituted an unlawful
form of correction.7 Nevertheless, because the court found strong
mitigating circumstances, Mary was fined one shilling for her crime.8
Over seventy years later the testimony of Harlow Green, on trial
for the assault and battery of his twelve-year-old daughter, indicates
that he too was faced with the quandary of how to punish a disobedi-
ent child.9 Mabel took a fifty-cent piece from her father without per-
mission and then compounded the problem by denying that she had
stolen the money." As punishment, Green ordered her to disrobe
and then beat her with a riding whip. 1 Covered in bruises and open
cuts, the child was locked in a room with her hands tied behind her
back, where she remained for three days with only bread and water
for sustenance. 2
At trial the defendant maintained that the jury should consider
whether his actions were protected because he was disciplining his
child for misconduct. He urged the court to adopt the rule of law that
precludes the prosecution of parents for the use of disciplinary force
1. See Rex v. Conner, 173 Eng. Rep. 194 (1836).




6. See id. at 195. The central focus of the opinion dealt with the fact that the fatal blow
had not been intended for the five-year-old victim. The court held that an unlawful blow, arising
from sudden passion constitutes the crime of manslaughter even if death results to an unin-
tended victim. See id.
7. See id. The court did not analyze the difference between lawful and unlawful punish-
ment. It merely concluded that the throwing of a poker is an "improper mode of correction"
and that the defendant intended to correct the older child "in a way that was unlawful." Id.
8. See id.
9. See People v. Green, 119 N.W. 1087 (Mich. 1909).




HeinOnline  -- 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 414 1998
PARENTAL CORPORAL PUNISHMENT DEFENSE
unless it results in permanent injury to the child.13 In support of his
position Mr. Harlow testified:
What I was trying to get her to say from Friday afternoon to Sun-
day morning was that she was going to try and do better and to
refrain from habits of dishonesty .... As I have had a chance to
look over the past two years and a half, I am satisfied that some
other method might have been used with the child to better ad-
vantage. It is hard for a man to decide those questions on the
spot.
1 4
In refusing to reverse the defendant's conviction, the court held that a
parent's use of disciplinary force need only be excessive or unreasona-
ble to fall outside the scope of lawful discipline.15
In 1993, James Edward Thompson expressed yet another reason
for disciplining a child.16 Although the exact nature of his child's in-
fraction is unclear, the reported decision, reviewing the defendant's
conviction for felony assault, establishes that Thompson believed his
religious principles directed the use of force against his ten-year-old
daughter.' 7 At an omnibus hearing, the defendant explained his
position:
Christianity in the New Testament of the Bible refers specifically
to the use of force on and in the rearing of children. It is direct in
its quotation, "To spare the rod and spoil the child."
This openly means that if a person, any person, in an attempt
to live a life in his personal religious manner may not be made to
submit to the atrocities of invasion of privacy, . . . or to be
brought before a charge which he may believe is a Godly action.
Remembering that in Christianity, child sacrifice was also ac-
cepted, any form of action less would be a merciful action.'8
Spanning a century and a half, these cases point toward some of
the many issues posed when a parent uses disciplinary force; the most
obvious of which is that parents, throughout time, have used physical
force in response to the perceived transgressions of children. Parents
utilize physical punishment because they do not know what else to do,
they are angry, it is their desire to instill moral and social values, or
they believe that religious beliefs dictate a physical response. At a
minimum, the latter two of these reasons center around the belief that
the use of force will ultimately benefit the child.
13. See id. at 1088.
14. Id. (emphasis added).
15. See id. at 1090.
16. See State v. Thompson, 865 P.2d 1125 (Mont. 1993).
17. See id. at 1129. The child had been repeatedly kicked, and there was extensive and
severe bruising on her arm, torso, back, and legs. See id. at 1128.
18. Id. at 1129 (emphasis added).
No. 21
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No matter what the motivation is for the use of such force, these
decisions also point to the fact that the criminal justice system is fre-
quently called upon to intervene when a disciplinary measure appears
to have entered the realm of criminal conduct. This occurs because
criminal laws are designed to protect humans from aggression that
could or does result in injury. When the issues of discipline and crimi-
nally inflicted harm intersect, the courts must then grapple with the
question of how much punishment is too much.
In the course of resolving this question, issues of law and fact
intertwined with the most basic of human emotions must be con-
fronted. Does a parent's right to direct the upbringing of a child pre-
clude state involvement in disciplinary matters in all but the worst
cases of abuse, or should state intervention be triggered by something
less? Should the circumstances surrounding imposition of the punish-
ment be evaluated by the fact finder, or are the reasons best left to
those most responsible for the child's welfare? Even if a child suffers
no physical injury, do certain disciplinary practices so offend notions
of decency that they warrant criminal penalties? Do societal perspec-
tives on the difference between crime and punishment change, or is a
child's life today worth more than a shilling?
To address these questions and others, society, courts, and legisla-
tive bodies have sought for centuries to define the often thin line be-
tween acceptable and unlawful punishment. 19 The refinement process
continues today, as evidenced by the fact that every state, 20 as well as
the U.S. Supreme Court,2 1 has addressed the use of disciplinary force
against children in one legal context or another. Although the civil
courts frequently have occasion to assess the legal ramifications of pa-
rental disciplinary force,22 the interplay between parental corporal
punishment and abuse is, perhaps, most dramatically confronted in
the criminal justice system, when a parent interposes a "justification"
19. For a discussion of the historical basis of corporal punishment, see Leonard P. Ed-
wards, Corporal Punishment and the Legal System, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 983, 986-90 (1996),
and Dean M. Herman, A Statutory Proposal to Prohibit the Infliction of Violence upon Children,
19 FAM. L.Q. 1, 2-10 (1985).
20. See infra Appendix.
21. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
22. The parental privilege to use disciplinary force has legal relevance in several situations.
The first is civil tort liability for physical harm inflicted upon a child by a parent. In the civil
context, a parent's right to use corporal punishment serves to insulate the parent from a damage
claim for injury to the child. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147 (1965). Additionally,
the parental right to use corporal punishment could arise in a civil juvenile proceeding. For
example, taking a child into the custody and control of the juvenile court is often precipitated by
allegations of child abuse. When abuse is alleged, the parent could assert the parental right to
utilize corporal punishment to refute the allegations of abuse. See, e.g., People v. In re M.A.L.,
592 P.2d 415, 417 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976); In re Ethan H., 609 A.2d 1222, 1225 (N.H. 1992) (re-
versing holding of Superior Court that found child had been abused); In re Rodney C., 398
N.Y.S.2d 511 (Fain. Ct. 1977). The third area where the privilege may be asserted is in a criminal
proceeding. In this situation a criminal defendant may assert the defense of "justification" if the
use of intentional physical force against the child fits within the lawful parameters of the parental
privilege. See discussion infra Part III.B.
[Vol. 1998
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defense. Thus, parents23 charged with a crime resulting from the use
of force against their children may assert the justification defense of
parental privilege when the force is used for a disciplinary purpose.24
This defense excuses a parent from criminal liability for aggressive or
assaultive conduct. Consequently, criminal laws excuse conduct that,
but for the parental privilege defense, would result in a conviction for
child abuse or assault.
Based upon historical, societal, and legal underpinnings, courts
have interpreted statutes and common-law doctrines addressing the
defense by balancing two principles. The first is that parents should
be free to raise their children without undue governmental influ-
ence.25 Second, courts assume that the use of force is lawful because,
and so long as, it is employed to promote the well-being of the child.
26
To accommodate the tension created by these two concerns, the
courts have articulated flexible legal standards that essentially require
that the use of force be reasonable, moderate, or not excessive. In
some states the concept of reasonable punishment is not defined.27 In
others, it is defined by listing conduct that is deemed to be unreasona-
ble. The definition of unreasonable punishment frequently includes
conduct that creates a substantial risk of, or results in, death, disfig-
urement, or serious physical or emotional injury.28 Using either ap-
proach, courts reason that when the force used is reasonable or
moderate, there is no need to interfere in family matters; if the force
exceeds this standard then the state may intervene because it is not
being used to promote the welfare of the child.29
As implemented, these standards provide a viable defense to par-
ents who use inconsequential force. For example, the offense of mis-
demeanor assault may criminalize conduct that results in an offensive
contact to another.3 ° Many common parental disciplinary measures
could be classified as the use of force that is offensive to the child.
The parental privilege to use corporal punishment uniformly insulates
parents from criminal liability for such conduct. At the other end of
the range of parental disciplinary measures, the parental privilege
does not alleviate criminal responsibility when parents murder their
23. For ease of discussion throughout this article, the term "parent" is used when address-
ing the situation when an adult is using force to discipline a child. As will be discussed in Part
IIE, the term "parent" has a broad application in this context and generally includes an adult
who has assumed responsibility for the welfare of the child.
24. See discussion infra Part III.E.
25. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
26. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 and III.E.
27. See discussion infra Part III.F; see also infra Appendix.
28. See discussion infra Part III.F; see also infra Appendix.
29. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08 cmt. 2 (1985); Anderson v. State, 487 A.2d 294, 297-99
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
30. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.070 (West 1994), which provides: "A person commits the
crime of assault in the third degree if: .... He knowingly causes physical contact with another
person knowing the person will regard the contact as offensive or provocative."
No. 2]
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children.31 Likewise, the privilege is not designed to shield parents
charged with serious felony abuse or assault charges when their disci-
plinary practices include conduct that is designed to, or does, result in
debilitating injury.32 Thus, although the adopted standards may be
adequate when addressing conduct at either end of the range of pa-
rental conduct, they are less satisfactory when dealing with parental
discipline that falls between an offensive contact and death or
debilitating injury. It is this type of parental conduct, generally en-
compassed by the crimes of misdemeanor assault or child abuse, that
presents the most obvious of the inadequacies of the parental corporal
punishment privilege.
Within this context, assertion of the privilege as a defense in a
criminal action implicates one of two concerns: either it fails to give
adequate guidance to parents as to when appropriate discipline stops
and abuse begins, or it falls short in addressing conduct that many
would find to be abusive. These factors alone necessitate an examina-
tion of the parental corporal punishment privilege. However, the
greatest problem emanating from the parental privilege to use discipli-
nary force is that in an attempt to accommodate traditional discipli-
nary practices, current standards hedge on the issue of whether
parents can physically injure their child. The net effect of this accom-
modation is the existence of legal standards that exacerbate the perva-
siveness of child abuse in this country.
To address these failures, a clear legal standard should be
adopted that precludes the use of force that results in physical injury
to the child. Implementation of this standard would not result in un-
due governmental intrusion into the family unit, would provide clear
guidance to parents, and would protect children from abuse. Most
important, a parental corporal punishment defense that clearly does
not extend to conduct that results in physical injury to the child is a
sensible, cost-effective measure that will lead to a society less tolerant
of child abuse.
There are many reasons why the criminal laws have been
designed to accommodate the use of force by parents. At the thresh-
old of the analysis, however, it must be recognized that the mere exist-
ence of the privilege is an acknowledgment that, as a society, we
condone the harm of children for the purpose of teaching them ac-
ceptable behavior. That is to say, if the conduct of the parent would
31. As one of the requirements of the privilege to use disciplinary force is that it be used to
promote the welfare of the child, it is self-evident that force resulting in death is not protected.
The privilege to use disciplinary force does not encompass force that results in death. However,
some states have enacted excusable homicide statutes that address the accidental death of a child
resulting from lawful discipline. See 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES CRIMINAL
PRACTICE SERIES § 144(a), at 162 n.1 (1984). The accidental death of children resulting from the
use of disciplinary force is a topic beyond the scope of the article.
32. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08; see also State v. Coombs, 381 A.2d 288, 289 (Me.
1978); Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 44 S.E.2d 419, 423-24 (Va. 1947).
[Vol. 1998
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be criminal in the absence of the privilege, and criminal laws are
designed to punish harmful aggression, then we must accept what
would otherwise be condemned as criminal behavior is acceptable be-
cause the victim is a child in need of discipline. The purpose of this
article is to explore the legal and societal consequences flowing from
this premise as implemented by the parental corporal punishment
privilege.
II. THE UNDERLYING CONCERNS
A. Child Abuse and Corporal Punishment: Is There a Connection?
That child abuse is a serious problem and a widespread American
phenomenon cannot be challenged. In 1995, an estimated 1215 chil-
dren died as the result of abuse or neglect in the United States.33
Approximately forty-three percent of these children had contact with
a social service agency prior to their death, forty-nine percent died
from abuse, and another eleven percent died from a combination of
abuse and neglect. 34 During the same year, it has been estimated that
996,000, or fifteen children per 1000, were substantiated as victims of
abuse and neglect.35 Twenty-five percent of these children were vic-
tims of physical abuse, and three percent were victims of emotional
abuse.36 Thus, twenty-eight percent of the children substantiated as
victims of abuse suffered the type of abuse at issue when parents use
disciplinary force.
A multitude of problems have been cited as contributing factors
to the abuse epidemic.37 In 1995, however, social service agencies
listed substance abuse, poverty and economic stress, and the lack of
parenting skills as the top three contributors to the problem of child
abuse a.3  Although substance abuse and poverty are factors with a
complex relationship to how we discipline children, parenting skills, or
the lack thereof, have a direct and obvious connection to the way chil-
dren are corrected for inappropriate behavior.
Although the magnitude of the child abuse problem cannot be
disputed, less data exists to correlate the interplay between discipline
33. See CHING-TUNG LUNG & DEBORAH DARO, CURRENT TRENDS IN CHILD ABUSE RE-
PORTING AND FATALITIES: THE RESULTS OF THE 1995 ANNUAL FIFTY STATE SURVEY 12 (Na-
tional Ctr. on Child Abuse Prevention Working Paper No. 808, 1996) [hereinafter 1995 ANNUAL
FIFTY STATE SURVEY].
34. See id. at 15 tbl.3.
35. See id. at 6. This figure represents only substantiated instances of abuse. Substantiated
abuse follows a determination by an agency of the state that abuse or neglect has in fact oc-
curred. See id. at 3.
36. See id. at 7. The remaining cases of substantiated abuse in 1995 included the categories
of neglect (54%), sexual abuse (11%), and other (6%). See id.
37. See SUSAN JANKO, VULNERABLE CHILDREN, VULNERABLE FAMILIES: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF CHILD ABUSE 1-7 (1994),
38. See 1995 ANNUAL FiF-rY STATE SURVEY, supra note 33, at 10-11.
No. 21
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and abuse.39 However, certain factors suggest that the potential for
interrelationship is present. First, it is clear that most children who
suffer from abuse do so at the hands of their parents or other
caregiver. ° Statistics indicate that approximately twelve percent of
abuse cases result from acts by individuals who are not related to the
child.'" Thus, most abuse can be attributed to adults who are respon-
sible for the well-being of the child. Second, there is widespread ac-
ceptance of the use of corporal punishment in our society."2 Societal
acceptance of corporal punishment is reflected by the legal recogni-
tion of the parental force privilege and by studies conducted from the
1950s through the 1990s that consistently indicate that greater than
ninety percent of American parents use physical force to punish their
children."3 If the use of physical force on children is condoned by
most parents and if most children are abused by their caregivers, it is
reasonable to speculate that there may be some relationship between
abuse and discipline. Several studies discussed below confirm this
hypothesis.
In a 1967-68 study, David Gil attempted to extrapolate data aris-
ing from reported instances of child abuse." The findings reported
from this study isolate a number of factors considered to be contribu-
tors to the child abuse phenomenon. However, the leading factor
cited by Gil was the use of disciplinary force. Specifically, the study
indicated that sixty-three percent of the children studied had been
subjected to abuse as the result of a parental response to the child's
39. See MURRAY A. STRAUS, BEATING THE DEVIL OUT OF THEM: CORPORAL PUNISH-
MENT IN AMERICAN FAMILIES AND ITS EFFECT ON CHILDREN 12 (1994). Straus, in his discussion
of the connection between abuse and parental discipline, refers to what he calls a "conspiracy of
silence" concerning the issue of corporal punishment. See id. at 10. It is his premise that experts
writing on both child development and child abuse commonly make no mention of, or only brief
reference to, the fact that corporal punishment is an integral part of child rearing in American
families. See id. He speculates that the reluctance to broach this issue stems from a deeply
ingrained cultural commitment to the practice and a fear by authors that rejection of the practice
will result in a loss of rapport with parents. See id. at 12.
40. See JANKO, supra note 37, at 25 (citing Bronfenbrenner (1974), American Humane
Association (1986)); see also James Garbarino, The Incidence and Prevalence of Child Maltreat-
ment, in 11 FAMILY VIOLENCE 219, 228 tbl.4 (1989) (indicating that in approximately 83% of
cases of major physical abuse of children, a parent is the perpetrator); Edward Zigler & Nancy
W. Hall, Physical Child Abuse in America: Past, Present and Future, in CHILD MALTREATMENT:
THEORY AND RESEARCH ON THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
38, 51-52 (Dante Cicchetti & Vicki Carlson eds., 1989) (indicating that "[m]others (or 'mother
substitutes') were found to be responsible for 47.6% of the abuse cases researched, while 39.2%
of the incidents involved father or father substitutes," and "[njinety percent of abusive incidents
take place in the child's own home").
41. See JANKO, supra note 37, at 25 (citing American Humane Association (1986),
Bronfenbrenner (1974), and Garbarino (1976)).
42. See Donna Duvall & Alan Booth, Social Class, Stress and Physical Punishment, 9 INT'L
REV. MOD. Soc'Y 103, 117 (1979).
43. See Murray A. Straus, Discipline and Deviance: Physical Punishment of Children and
Violence and Other Crime in Adulthood, 38 Soc. PROB. 133, 136 (1991).
44. See DAVID G. GIL, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN: PHYSICAL CHILD ABUSE IN THE
UNITED STATES 71-74, 92-104 (1970).
[Vol. 1998
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perceived misconduct.45 In a 1974-75 study of child abuse, Kadushin
and Martin attempted to study the physical abuse of Wisconsin chil-
dren.46 In the course of this study, 830 reports of physical abuse of
children by parents were examined, and interviews were conducted
with sixty-six parents who acknowledged that they had injured their
child.4 7 Based upon data from this study, Kadushin and Martin con-
clude that abuse consistently.begins as a parental response to a child's
behavior that causes the parent to initiate a disciplinary action.48 The
initial parental response was generally a "low-level non-corporal re-
sponse '49 followed by an abusive act precipitated by the child's re-
sponse to the initial parental action.5 ° Moreover, they conclude that
even after intervention by a protective service agency, parents
"tended to perceive their behavior as having an essentially disciplinary
intent rather than being abusive."'5 .
Finally, in a study conducted by Professor Murray Straus, it was
determined that parents who support the use of corporal punishment
"not only hit more often, but they more often go beyond ordinary
physical punishment and assault the child in ways which carry a
greater risk of injury to the child."52 These studies indicate that there
is a substantial likelihood that child abuse commonly begins as corpo-
ral punishment administered for disciplinary purposes.53
None of these social scientists suggest that all parents who use
corporal punishment abuse their children. Moreover, it cannot be dis-
puted that child abuse is a multidimensional problem. In addition to
the factors of poverty, substance abuse, and lack of parenting skills
mentioned above, historical acceptance of maltreatment of children,54
intergenerational transmission of abuse, and stress caused by health
45. See id. at 126-30.
46. See ALFRED KADUSHIN & JUDITH A. MARTIN, CHILD ABUSE: AN INTERACTIONAL
EVENT 92-104 (1981).
47. See id. at 97-99, 253.
48. See id. at 253.
49. Id. at 250.
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. Straus, supra note 43, at 141-42.
53. See Zigler & Hall, supra note 40, at 57; see also EDWARD ZIGLER & NANCY HALL,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CHILD ABUSE: USING MULTIDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH TO
IMPROVE MEASUREMENT AND CONTROL (Contract No. 1287-4464, 1984); Murray A. Straus &
Carrie L. Yodanis, Corporal Punishment by Parents: Implications for Primary Prevention of As-
saults on Spouses and Children, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 35, 55-56 (1995).
54. See RUTH S. KEMPE & C. HENRY KEMPE, CHILD ABUSE 3-6 (1978).
55. See Joan Kaufman & Edward Zigler, The Intergenerational Transmission of Child
Abuse, in CHILD MALTREATMENT: THEORY AND RESEARCH ON THE CAUSES AND CONSE-
QUENCES OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 40, at 129, 135. This article takes the
position that the relationship between being abused as a child and subsequently abusing off-
spring has been overstated by other researchers. The authors, however, estimate that an accu-
rate projection of the intergenerational theory may be a 25% to 35% transmission rate, a rate of
occurrence characterized as "scarcely inconsequential." See id. at 135.
No. 2]
HeinOnline  -- 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 421 1998
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
problems, unemployment, or marital/personal relationships56 have
also been identified as factors contributing to the prevalence of child
abuse. Recognizing the complexity of the problem does not diminish
the significance of studies indicating that abuse frequently finds its ori-
gins in the disciplinary use of physical force."
With the acknowledgement that abuse is a serious problem fre-
quently finding its origins in the use of disciplinary force, it becomes
important to consider whether current approaches to the parental
privilege to use disciplinary force accomplishes the dual tasks of pro-
tecting children from abuse and defining for parents the line between
criminal conduct and lawful punishment. This assessment begins with
an analysis of the policy reasons that shape and give context to the
parental privilege to use disciplinary force.
56. See KADUSHIN & MARTIN, supra note 46, at 226.
57. Although there is little dispute that abuse is a problem of tremendous significance and
complexity, and sound research to suggest that abuse commonly begins as a parental disciplinary
response, there is surprisingly little consensus about what the term "abuse" means. See Jeanne
Giovannoni, Definitional Issues in Child Maltreatment, in CHILD MALTREATMENT: THEORY
AND RESEARCH ON THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra
note 40, at 3, 8-16; Susan J. Zuravin, Research Definitions of Child Physical Abuse and Neglect:
Current Problems, in THE EFFECTS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: ISSUES AND RESEARCH
100-24 (Raymond Starr, Jr. & David Wolfe eds., 1991). Social scientists, medical professionals,
and civil and criminal laws each give a slightly different slant to the meaning attached to the term
"abuse." Criminal laws that address the crime of child abuse also vary in terms of the specificity
used to outline the meaning of the term abuse. Some states use very broad language to define
the crime of "abuse." For example, abuse is broadly defined in California as "willfully" causing
a child to "suffer... unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering." CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a)
(West 1988). Indiana defines abuse as conduct that "knowingly" may "endanger" the "life or
health" of the child. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-4 (West 1994). Other states may provide greater
specificity in defining abuse. For example, Arizona defines "abuse" as "the infliction or allowing
of physical injury, impairment of bodily function or disfigurement or the infliction of or allowing
another person to cause serious emotional damage as evidenced by severe anxiety, depression,
withdrawal or untoward aggressive behavior." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-546 (West 1989).
And finally, in some states great specificity is provided by including specific types of injury that
are not permitted. Virginia is one such state. "For purposes of this subsection, 'serious injury'
shall include but not be limited to (i) disfigurement, (ii) fracture, (iii) a severe burn or laceration,
(iv) mutilation, (v) maiming, (vi) forced ingestion of dangerous substances, or (vii) life-threaten-
ing internal injuries." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.1 (Michie 1996). The lack of consensus in
defining the term "abuse" may have important ramifications for assessing the societal impact of
abuse, but in the legal context broadly drawn definitions of abuse are a response to the need to
capture the infinite number of ways that adults can cause criminal harm to a child.
Moreover, it can be argued that it is primarily within the context of the parental corporal
punishment defense that the issue of whether a child has been assaulted or abused becomes
difficult. That is to say, what the law condemns as the abuse or assault of a child is relatively
clear-cut in a practical context, unless the parental defense is at issue. For example, if a stranger
hurts or causes a child pain, whatever the motivation for the infliction of the force, the crimes of
child abuse or assault are meant to address the conduct. If a parent engages in similar conduct
that is gratuitous in nature and not in response to the conduct of the child, the crimes of assault
or child abuse have been designed to punish the conduct. Stated otherwise, criminal laws gener-
ally have no trouble defining or responding to child abuse unless the issue of parental discipline
is injected. Thus, although it might be assumed that the lack of consensus as to what is or is not
abuse contributes to the difficulties in articulating the parental defense, it is just as likely that the
existence of the defense serves as an obstacle in reaching a societal consensus about what is or is
not abuse. Whether the latter conclusion is correct or a classic chicken-and-egg dilemma posed
is difficult to assess.
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B. Policy Issues and Public Opinion
From the earliest applications of the privilege, courts have relied
on two assumptions when excusing parents from criminal liability re-
sulting from the use of disciplinary force. First is the supposition that
the force is being used to promote the best interests of the child. 58
The logic underlying this assumption is that any physical harm that
results to the child is outweighed by the benefits derived from the
punishment imposed and that the use of physical force is a practice
that promotes the best interests of the child. Second, the courts have
reasoned that it is inappropriate for the state to unnecessarily inter-
fere in parental determinations of the appropriate measures to be
taken in teaching children the limits of acceptable conduct.59 These
two factors have served as the primary force behind the continuing
viability and scope of the parental corporal punishment defense. Con-
sequently, whether the use of corporal punishment promotes the wel-
fare of the child, as well as the rationale behind protecting a parent's
right to use disciplinary force, should be examined.
1. The Welfare of the Child
Whether corporal punishment can be considered to be a benefit
to the child is an issue that can be evaluated from an individual and
societal perspective. The above-mentioned studies indicating that
abuse frequently has its origins in discipline weaken the argument that
corporal punishment is a benefit to children from a societal perspec-
tive. The analysis from the individual perspective addresses the direct
and/or long-term impact on a child who has been subjected to corpo-
ral punishment.
Although the direct impact of corporal punishment on children
has not received a great deal of attention from social scientists or
child-welfare professionals, Professor Murray A. Straus6" has devoted
a significant portion of his career to the study of corporal punishment
and its effects on children.6' Work spanning several decades has lead
Straus to the conclusion that "corporal punishment plays a crucial role
in training people to accept violence in human relationships."62
58. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 487 A.2d 294, 298 (Md. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Singleton,
705 P.2d 825, 827 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985); see also discussion infra Part III.E.
59. See, e.g., People v. Sambo, 554 N.E.2d 1080, 1088 (I11. App. Ct. 1990); State v. Black,
227 S.W.2d 1006, 1009 (Mo. 1950); State v. Sinica, 372 N.w.2d 445, 447 (Neb. 1985); see also
discussion infra Parts II.B.2, III.C.
60. Professor Straus is the Codirector of the Family Research Laboratory and professor of
sociology at the University of New Hampshire. See Straus & Yodanis, supra note 53, at 35.
61. See, e.g., RICHARD J. GELLES & MURRAY A. STRAUS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE (1988);
STRAUS, supra note 39; Straus, supra note 43; Murray A. Straus & Richard J. Gelles, Societal
Change and Change in Family Violence from 1975-1985 as Revealed by Two National Surveys, 48
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 465 (1986); Murray A. Straus, Measuring Intrafamily Conflict and Vio-
lence: The Conflict Tactics (CT) Scales, 41 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 75 (1979).
62. Straus & Yodanis, supra note 53, at 37.
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Straus argues that because corporal punishment is often used on
very small children, who have not yet learned to speak, it conveys to
the child perspectives on violence that become an integral part of his
or her personality.63 What becomes embedded in the fiber of the
child is the acceptance of a relationship between love and violence.'
That is to say, because children are generally hit by their parents, a
child reasons that she is most apt to be struck by individuals with
whom she is intimately involved. Moreover, because corporal punish-
ment is commonly associated with a parent's concern for the child, a
child learns that it is morally acceptable to strike a loved one.65 With
these assumptions as the starting point of his analysis, Straus under-
took a study to determine if adults who were subjected to corporal
punishment as children were more likely to abuse their partners.66
A 1985 study involving over 4000 families determined that there
was a correlation between being hit as a child and assaulting a spouse
as an adult.67 The analysis conducted by Straus in this study provided
support for three reasons linking corporal punishment and spousal
abuse. First, in what Straus calls "modeling of implicit cultural
norms," he reasons that because children who are struck learn that it
is morally acceptable to strike someone who misbehaves, it becomes
appropriate to strike a partner who fails to meet expectations of rea-
sonable conduct.6" Second, Straus contends that children who grow
up in homes where the use of corporal punishment is prevalent fail to
develop problem-solving skills based upon nonviolent conflict resolu-
tion.69 Finally, his study indicates that the use of corporal punishment
is associated with an increased risk of depression and that depressed
individuals are more likely to engage in aggressive conduct. 70 Impor-
tantly, these same variables also impact the probability that a parent
who has experienced corporal punishment as a child will also abuse
his or her own child. 1
The work conducted by Straus strongly suggests that corporal
punishment may do little to promote the well-being of the child.
When considered in conjunction with the above-mentioned studies
linking abuse and discipline, it must be questioned whether discipli-
nary force promotes the welfare of the child from either an individual
or societal perspective.
63. See id. at 37-38.
64. See id. at 38.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 36-37.
67. See id. at 40, 44.
68. Id. at 44.
69. See id. at 45-46.
70. See id. at 46.
71. See id. at 61.
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2. Parental Autonomy
Even if we accept as true the assertion that corporal punishment
does not promote the well-being of the child from either an individual
or societal perspective, it is important to remember that the well-being
of the child is only half of the legal equation. The other countervailing
concern at the heart of the parental privilege to use disciplinary force
is that the state should, when possible, refrain from interfering in mat-
ters of family autonomy.
At the core of every society are values that the culture recognizes
as fundamental to its existence. Few would deny that the translation
of these values into meaningful standards of behavior takes place
within the family unit. This means that parents assume the role of
passing cultural values to their children. Parents pass values from
their generation to the next by modeling acceptable behavior, provid-
ing an environment that meets the physical and emotional needs of
the child, and by establishing parameters for acceptable behavior.
Each of these functions is related to the way that children are
disciplined.
Because the family unit is the primary vehicle for transmitting
cultural values, the law has recognized throughout history that the
sanctity of the family unit must be preserved and allowed to operate
with the least governmental intrusion possible. Governmental intru-
sion into the parent-child relationship is deemed undesirable because
it stands at the core of family life. That our society reveres the family
unit, and in particular the parent-child relationship, is reflected by
Supreme Court decisions addressing the constitutional status of do-
mestic authority.7"
a. Constitutional Status of Domestic Authority
Although the Supreme Court decisions that examine the legal
dimensions of the parent-child relationship have never squarely ad-
dressed the constitutionality of the parental corporal punishment priv-
ilege, they do provide insight into this issue. In the broadest sense,
three points can be gleaned from these decisions. First, the parent-
child relationship creates a Fourteenth Amendment parental "liberty
interest" designed to allow parents to direct the upbringing of their
children.7 3 Second, this parental right is not unfettered and may be-
come secondary to interests of the state.74 Third, the use of physical
force is an acceptable means of controlling a child.75
72. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. The phrase "domestic authority" is used
to denote the inherent nature of the parent-child relationship. See Anderson v. State, 487 A.2d
294, 297 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
73. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
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The case trilogy of Meyer v. Nebraska,76 Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters,77 and Prince v. Massachusetts78 are often included among the first
cases establishing that the Fourteenth Amendment creates a liberty
interest that includes a parent's right to direct the upbringing of their
children.79 The first two of these decisions, Meyer and Pierce recog-
nized a fundamental parental liberty interest that superseded the in-
terest of the state.8" Prince v. Massachusetts held that the parental
interest was not the only issue of importance when children were
involved.81
Prince was convicted after she and her young niece were discov-
ered illegally distributing religious materials on the streets of Brock-
ton.82 The Court upheld the Massachusetts child labor law despite
Prince's claim that it violated her Fourteenth Amendment due process
parental rights, as well as her First Amendment right to freedom of
religion.83
In rejecting her claim, the Court first recognized that "[t]he par-
ent's conflict with the state over control of the child and his training is
serious enough when only secular matters are concerned. It becomes
the more so when an element of religious conviction enters."' De-
spite these two constitutional concerns, the Court held that when the
welfare of the child is at issue, the state has considerable power to
intervene:
Against these sacred private interests, basic in a democracy, stand
the interests of society to protect the welfare of children, and the
state's assertion of authority to that end .... It is [in] the interest
of youth itself and of the whole community, that children be both
76. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In Meyer the parental right to raise children without undue gov-
ernmental interference was interpreted to mean that a statute requiring English to be the sole
language taught in elementary school was an unconstitutional interference in the parental right
to direct the education of children. See id. at 400-01. The defendant was a schoolteacher who
was convicted of a misdemeanor for violating this statute. See id. at 396-97. The Court ulti-
mately concluded "[h]is right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct
their children, we think, are within the liberty of the Amendment." Id. at 400.
77. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In Pierce, an Oregon statute required children between eight and
sixteen to attend public school. See id. at 530. The Court held that the law "unreasonably inter-
feres with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control." Id. at 534-35. The Court also indicated that "[t]he child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." Id. at 535.
78. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
79. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-15 (1972); In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1372
(Utah 1982).
80. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
81. Prince, 321 U.S. at 165.
82. See id. at 159-61. Prince involved the appeal from a violation of a Massachusetts child
labor law by Prince, who was the aunt of nine-year-old Betty Simmons; the law prohibited mi-
nors from selling publications in public locations. See id.
83. See id. at 170.
84. Id. at 165.
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safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into
free and independent well-developed ... citizens.8 5
The Court concluded its discussion by saying the "state has a wide
range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things
affecting the child's welfare." 6
These decisions do not specifically indicate how the parental use
of physical force fits into the balance between the interest of the state
in protecting children and the interest of parents in raising their chil-
dren. Although the only Supreme Court case dealing with corporal
punishment arose outside the parent-child context, it should not be
ignored in assessing the constitutional parameters of the privilege.
Ingraham v. Wright87 dealt with a Florida statute that authorized
teachers to use reasonable corporal punishment as a means of main-
taining discipline. 88 The case arose following the administration of
"licks with a paddle" to James Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews.
89
The twenty "licks" administered to Ingraham resulted in a hematoma
requiring medical attention and absence from school for several days,
and the punishment to Andrews included striking him in a manner
that precluded him from using his arm for one week.9" The plaintiffs
alleged that the punishment violated the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. The Court rejected this con-
tention and upheld the right of the state to authorize the use of
corporal punishment by school administrators. 91
Because the case discusses corporal punishment outside the fam-
ily context and focuses upon Eighth Amendment questions, it cannot
be used as a definitive answer to the constitutional dimensions of the
parental privilege to use disciplinary force. It does, however, provide
some guidance with respect to potential issues of concern. First, in
discussing the right to use corporal punishment, the Court recognized
the common-law principles that both allow and restrict the use of
force. 92 Second, while noting that the use of corporal punishment was
subject to controversy, the Court indicated that there was no discern-
85. Id.
86. Id. at 167.
87. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
88. See id. at 655. Ingraham focuses on whether the use of corporal punishment in public
schools violates the Eighth Amendment, and to the extent that the use of such punishment is
constitutionally appropriate, whether Fourteenth Amendment due process requires notice and
opportunity to be heard prior to imposition of the punishment. See id. at 653. The Court indi-
cated that early cases viewed the authority of teachers to use corporal punishment as an exten-
sion of the parental authority to use force. See id. at 662. The more modern perspective is that
the state may allow the use of such force as a tool in achieving educational objectives. See id.
As such, the parental use of force is based upon the concept of domestic authority, and the use
of force by schools is based upon the authority of the state. See id.
89. See id. at 656.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 664. The Court limits application of the Eighth Amendment to "those con-
victed of crimes." Id.
92. See id. at 661.
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able trend toward the elimination of the practice, and nothing about
the Court's opinion provides a basis to speculate that the Court finds
the practice to be unacceptable. 93 The Prince, Pierce, and Meyer deci-
sions point toward the conclusion that parents have a fundamental
interest in raising children as they see fit. Ingraham implicitly in-
cludes the use of corporal punishment as one of the tools available to
parents in accomplishing this function. Equally clear from these deci-
sions is the conclusion that the right to use corporal punishment can
be restricted by the state. That restriction will withstand constitu-
tional challenge if it is designed to protect the welfare of the child.
Although a complete abolition of the privilege could be determined to
be invasive of a parent's Fourteenth Amendment rights, it would ap-
pear that the states may define and delineate the scope of the privi-
lege without risk of constitutional challenge.
b. Public Support for Domestic Authority
Whether laws are shaped by society or society is shaped by laws is
a difficult question to answer. However, the Supreme Court's tacit
approval of corporal punishment as an integral aspect of family auton-
omy seems to be strongly supported by the public. Moreover, studies
discussed below also demonstrate that disciplinary force is frequently
utilized by parents not only during infancy, but also throughout a
child's tenure in the home.
As mentioned above, based upon data from the National Family
Violence Survey conducted in 1975, Straus indicated that ninety per-
cent of the surveyed parents expressed approval of physical punish-
ment.94 In a 1992 study comparing the prevalence of corporal
punishment in the United States and India, researchers indicated that
ninety-three percent of American males and ninety-two percent of
American females experienced corporal punishment as children.95
These figures are remarkably consistent with studies conducted in
1957 indicating that ninety-nine percent of the mothers surveyed used
physical punishment in raising their children,96 and a 1982 study of
93. See id. at 661-62. Although the Court's opinion notes that there is no discernable trend
toward the elimination of corporal punishment in schools, such a conclusion is no longer correct.
At the time the opinion was published, the Court indicated that only two states had enacted
legislation prohibiting the use of corporal punishment in schools. See id. at 663. Recent studies
indicate that 25 states have now outlawed the use of corporal punishment in schools. See
STRAUS, supra note 39, at 172.
94. See Straus, supra note 43, at 140, 153.
95. See Anthony M. Graziano et al., Physical Punishment in Childhood and Current Atti-
tudes: An Exploratory Comparison of College Students in the United States and India, 7 J. Ir'rER-
PERSONAL VIOLENCE 147, 149 (1992).
96. See ROBERT R. SEARS ET AL., PATTERNS OF CHILD REARING 328 (1957).
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college students indicating that ninety-five percent had experienced
corporal punishment during their lifetime.97
Although it is true that there is a greater reliance on corporal
punishment in the early years of a child's life, studies also indicate that
the practice frequently continues well into the child's adolescence. 98
One study concluded that more than ninety percent of American par-
ents use corporal punishment on toddlers and more than half continue
the use of force into adolescence. 99 Studies conducted in the 1970s
indicated that approximately one-fourth of the surveyed high school
seniors had been struck.100 A recent study, based upon data collected
from a large sample of adult men and women, concluded that approxi-
mately half of American adolescents are hit by their parents and that
the median rate of occurrence is four times during a twelve-month
period. 01
Each of these studies supports the premise that as a society we
endorse and utilize corporal punishment to discipline children. This
strong public support would not exist in the absence of a cultural be-
lief in its validity and necessity. Stated otherwise, America must be-
lieve that corporal punishment promotes the well-being of the child.
As such, excessive governmental intrusion into the practice of using
corporal punishment is unlikely to be supported by the public. This
means that, as applied to the use of corporal punishment, the second
philosophical pillar, which stresses the parental right to raise children
without undue governmental interference, is not only supported by
the courts but is also embraced by the public.
Thus, on one hand, we have social science research indicating that
the use of any corporal punishment may not be in the best interests of
the child, and on the other, legal and popular support that it is. The
tug-of-war between the welfare of the child and autonomy principles
provides at least a partial explanation of why it is difficult to develop
standards defining the parental corporal punishment defense. More-
over, it calls into play an examination of how the policy concerns driv-
ing the defense factor into the premise that current standards are
inadequate.
The first policy concern, which addresses the welfare of the child,
wraps around the privilege in two ways. First, there is the assumption
that parental autonomy, however it is exercised, is not an absolute
97. See Janice Westlund Bryan & Florence Wallach Freed, Corporal Punishment: Norma-
tive Data and Sociological and Psychological Correlates in a Community Population, 11 J.
YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 77, 85 (1982).
98. A detailed discussion of corporal punishment of adolescents can be found in Murray A.
Straus & Denise Donnelly, Corporal Punishment of Adolescents by American Parents, 24 YOUTH
& Soc'y 419, 419-39 (1993).
99. See STRAUS, supra note 54, at 57.
100. See Murray A. Straus & Denise A. Donnelly, Corporal Punishment of Adolescents by
American Parents, 24 YOUTH & Soc'y 419 (1993).
101. See id. at 437.
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right, but rather is tempered by the interest of the state in regulating
matters related to the well-being of the child.1"2 Second, this particu-
lar defense rests upon the assumption that the force used will benefit
the child. 103 Emanating from common-law concepts of justice, this as-
sumption was placed at the crux of the privilege at a time when child
abuse was not a recognized phenomenon and social science research
was nonexistent. 0 4
Taken together, these two factors indicate that modern perspec-
tives on the use and consequences of corporal punishment should
have a spillover effect on the manner in which the second prong, pa-
rental autonomy, is construed. That is to say, although the importance
of parental autonomy should not be minimized, the state's ability to
regulate the authority that arises therefrom should be enhanced if the
use of corporal punishment is of minimal benefit to the child.
To accommodate these competing concerns, the policy reasons
behind the defense should be interpreted in a balanced fashion that
reflects modern concepts of abuse. If either concern predominates,
compelling interests founded upon sound legal and factual realities
will be minimized. Stated otherwise, when one concern supersedes
the other, either children will be at greater risk for abuse, or parents
will be unfairly subjected to criminal prosecution. On the other hand,
if, in an attempt to accommodate both concerns, nebulous standards
are implemented then instead of negative implications arising for one
of the constituencies, arguably both are at risk. Parental autonomy is
then weakened, risks of prosecution are enhanced, and children are at
greater risk for abuse when no one knows where discipline stops and
abuse begins. Although current standards have most certainly been
designed to reflect a balancing of these policy concerns, the standards,
as implemented in many jurisdictions, fail to accomplish this goal.
III. THE SCOPE OF PRIVILEGE
A. The Underlying Offense
In the criminal context, the parental privilege to use disciplinary
force arises when a parent is charged with a crime of aggression. The
use of inappropriate force against person or property is an omnipres-
ent theme of criminal jurisprudence. When parents use force against
their children, however, they are commonly charged with the crime of
assault, child abuse or endangerment, or domestic abuse. Because the
102. See, e.g., State v. Thorpe, 429 A.2d 785, 788 (R.I. 1981).
103. See, e.g., id.; State v. Koonse, 101 S.W. 139, 141 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907) ("The welfare of
the child is the principal ground on which the parental right to chastise him is founded."); see
also infra Part III.C; supra note 59 and accompanying text.
104. Although the abuse of children is a phenomena as old as mankind, modem recognition
of the problem is often credited to a 1962 study describing the "battered child syndrome." See
C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 17 (1962).
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defense must be evaluated within the context of the crimes to which it
applies, it is important to review the laws that encompass aggressive
conduct against children.
One hallmark of the criminal justice system is the principle that
the wrong resulting from criminal conduct harms not only the victim,
but society as well. 105 Indeed, the harm caused by physically aggres-
sive conduct is so detrimental that state-sanctioned punishment is
deemed to be appropriate. 1°6 Due to the unlimited number of ways
human aggression can be displayed and ever-evolving standards of
human interaction, laws defining this type of crime are richly varied.
However, the most universal and enduring legal mechanism for pun-
ishing human aggression is encompassed by the crime of assault.
10 7
Moreover, the statutory framework created to define, prohibit, and
punish a defendant for the crime of assault incorporates concepts
common to many crimes designed to protect individuals, including
children, from aggressive conduct.
105. In the most general sense, criminal laws designed to address human aggression are
intended to respond to human conduct at its worst. These laws define physical conduct that goes
beyond the boundaries of acceptable human interaction. They are not designed to promote
conflict resolution, make model citizens, or for that matter model parents. Rather, the focus is
on conduct that is so detrimental that it is harmful not only to the physical well-being of the
victim, but also to the fabric of society. Consequently, laws designed to protect children from
harm are important because as a society we have determined that hurting children is detrimental
to the interests of our culture.
106. Because of the far-reaching consequences of conduct deemed to be criminal, the impo-
sition of state sanctioned punishment becomes appropriate. Indeed, punishment is one of the
primary characteristics that serves to delineate criminal conduct from that which is merely harm-
flt or damaging and thus actionable in the civil courts. See JEROME HALL ET AL., CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE 167 (3d ed. 1976). Traditionally, punishment is said to be for the pur-
poses of retribution, rehabilitation, and deterrence. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMI-
NAL LAW 24 (2d ed. 1988); James J. Gobert, The Fortuity of Consequence, 4 CRIM. L.F. 1 (1993).
The consequences of punishment include deprivation of property interests, deprivation of liberty
interests, and, at the extreme, deprivation of life itself. The point of interest within the context
of this discussion is that as a society we embrace the concept of punishment as a response to
inappropriate behavior by adults. We assume that state-imposed punishment is a morally appro-
priate response (retribution), that will dissuade others from similar conduct (deterrence), and
that will teach adults to refrain from such conduct in the future (rehabilitation). To accomplish
these goals, fines or incarceration is imposed. The range of punishment does not include corpo-
ral punishment. Moreover, once incarcerated, inmates may not be corporally punished. See
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 660 (1977); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir.
1968). Implicit in this development is the recognition that as a society we do not tolerate the use
of physical punishment to accomplish the goals of retribution, rehabilitation, or deterrence, at
least as far as adults are concerned. That is of course true but for one exception, the death
penalty (the ultimate corporal punishment), an anomaly beyond the scope of this article.
107. At common law, assaultive conduct was commonly divided into several categories.
Mayhem was classically a felony reserved for assaults resulting in serious physical injury, perma-
nent bodily damage, or disfigurement. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 cmt. 1 (1980) (discuss-
ing historical treatment of the crime of assault). Conduct less deserving of serious punishment
included the misdemeanor offenses of battery and assault. See id. Battery was defined as the
unlawful application of force to another, and assault was treated as an attempt to cause a bat-
tery. See id. Today, the classification of aggressive conduct into mayhem, battery, and assault
has largely been abandoned and replaced by graduated assault statutes that encompass each of
the distinct common-law crimes. See id.
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Any discussion of the crime of assault should begin with the ac-
knowledgment that there are a great many statutory adaptations and
nuances that impact the definition and scope of the crime of assault.
With this caveat in mind, statutory approaches to the crime of assault
generally are divided into categories or grades. 108 For example, the
Model Penal Code first classifies aggravated assault as either an at-
tempt to cause, or the actual infliction of, serious bodily injury.1 0 9
This category of assault is routinely treated as a serious felony, and
the range of punishment is substantial. 110 A second category is re-
served for conduct that poses less risk to the physical well-being of
others and is generally applicable when the conduct either results in
physical injury or attempts to cause such injury. Simple assault is clas-
sified as a misdemeanor." 1 Under the Model Penal Code approach, a
third type of conduct is included as simple assault. The third situation
contemplates conduct that has no physical consequence. Instead it ad-
dresses conduct designed to place another in fear of serious injury.11 2
Although the Model Penal Code is characteristic in many aspects, ju-
risdictions may also classify physical contact that does not result in
injury, but that is instead merely offensive, as a misdemeanor of-
fense.' 13 Because the harm or potential for harm resulting from the
conduct is one of the major dividing lines for distinguishing one grade
of assault from another, the statutory definition of the degree of harm
(i.e., whether physicallbodily injury or serious physical/bodily injury
has occurred) is significant. 14
108. See id. § 211.1.
109. See id. § 211.1(2). Although the degree of injury resulting from the conduct is an im-
portant basis for distinguishing one grade of assault from another, it is important to note that it is
not only the degree of injury inflicted, but also the potential for causing harm that is evaluated.
In contrast to the common-law approach to assault, modem classification schemes, such as the
Model Penal Code, look at the potential for harm caused by the conduct in addition to the result.
See id. § 211.1 cmt. 2. As a mechanism for evaluating the risk of harm, some statutory
frameworks do not treat conduct amounting to an attempt and conduct resulting in the actual
infliction of injury as two separate crimes. See id. The basis for the elimination of this distinc-
tion is the principle that the punishment of the conduct should not focus solely on the conse-
quence. Rather, the conduct should be evaluated for its likely potential for harm. See id. For
example, consider the situation where a parent tries to drown a child by holding him underwater.
In one instance, the child might suffer serious brain damage; in another, the child might fully
recover, with no ensuing physical consequence. In both situations the conduct of the parent was
the same. If the only matter of importance was the degree of harm inflicted, the parent in the
second situation would not be held criminally responsible for his conduct. As such, it is reasoned
that an attempt to cause injury should be punished in the same fashion as one in which injury
results.
110. See id. § 211.1(2); see also id. § 5.05.
111. See id. § 211.1(1).
112. See id. § 211.1(1)(c). Under the Model Penal Code, simple assault occurs when the
defendant "attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily in-
jury." Id.
113. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.070 (West 1979) ("A person commits the crime of as-
sault in the third degree if . . . [h]e knowingly causes physical contact with another person
knowing the person will regard the contact as offensive or provocative.").
114. Because one basis for distinguishing grades of assault is the degree of harm, the defini-
tions of the terms "serious physical injury" versus "physical injury" are of great importance. See
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The crimes of child abuse and child endangerment, like the crime
of assault, are designed to protect the physical integrity of children.
Characteristically, these crimes overlap with the crime of assault, in-
cluding the same types of injury contemplated by the assault stat-
utes.115 They may also classify grades of the offense based upon the
degree of harm inflicted. This type of crime, however, may also ad-
dress the issue of neglect, preclude conduct that affects the emotional
well-being of the child, or prohibit conduct that is degrading or uncon-
scionable even though it has no discernable physical consequence.116
Finally, the crime of domestic abuse often encompasses acts of aggres-
sion against children taking place within the home. 7 In leaving this
topic, it is important to note again that many statutes make it a crime
to cause another person physical or bodily injury. In some instances
these crimes specifically address physical injury to a child." 8 Thus, in
one aspect the message is sent that children should not be abused and
that abuse includes physical injury. The waters become muddied,
however, when the issue of disciplinary force is injected. In this one
circumstance, what constitutes abuse becomes less clear.
B. The Defense
No matter what form criminally aggressive conduct against chil-
dren takes, or how the state chooses to charge the offense, defenses
infra note 337 and accompanying text. The states define these terms many different ways. The
Model Penal Code defines bodily injury as "physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical
condition." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(2). Some states do not include pain as a component of
physical injury. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109 (Supp. 1997). What one state may class-
ify as serious physical injury may mirror another state's definition of the term "physical injury."
Compare MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13J (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (defining "bodily injury" as
"substantial impairment of the physical condition including any burn, fracture of any bone, sub-
dural hematoma, injury to any internal organ"), with UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109 (Supp. 1997)
(defining "serious physical injury" to include "fracture of any bone; ... intracranial bleeding,
swelling or contusion of the brain; . . . any burn; .... any damage to internal organs of the
body"). These definitions become important within the context of a parent using force to disci-
pline a child because, if broadly defined, the terms encompass conduct that many consider to fall
within the range of reasonable parental discipline. For example, if it is a crime to intentionally
cause physical injury to another and the term "physical injury" is defined to include pain, then a
parent who swats the hand of a child reaching for a knife would be guilty of assault. It is this
type of parental action that logically necessitates the existence of the parental corporal punish-
ment defense. The crime of assault is intended to encompass many different types of aggression.
As such it makes sense that the statutory definitions of the degree of harm required for convic-
tion are broadly drawn. However, because these broad definitions take into their sweep normal
parental conduct, it is important that the scope of the parental privilege be clearly articulated in
a general application statute that applies to all criminal offenses.
115. See Anderson v. State, 487 A.2d 294, 297 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (discussing the
overlap between assault and child abuse statutes).
116. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3623 (West Supp. 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 273(a) (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-401 (Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1102
(Supp. 1996); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-4.3, 5/12-21.6, 130/2 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 726.6 (West Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 568.045-.060 (West Supp. 1997).
117. See, e.g., OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25 (Anderson 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 40 (West 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996).
118. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3623.
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that shield a defendant from liability may be asserted. One of several
defenses that may be asserted by a defendant charged with a crime of
aggression is the defense of justification. Justification provisions re-
move liability for otherwise criminal conduct because the aggressive
behavior of the defendant is deemed to be appropriate under the cir-
cumstances. When the defense of justification is asserted, the criminal
defendant agrees that he acted in an aggressive manner towards the
victim. He also asserts, however, that his actions were in response to
conduct of the victim. For example, the justification defense of "self-
defense" excuses the defendant who can establish that his actions
were necessary to defend himself from the aggression of the victim.11 9
Or, the justification defense of "defense of another" comes into play
when the defendant asserts that he was protecting a third party from
an act of aggression by the victim.12° "Justified" conduct in these two
situations serves as a defense to criminal liability because the aggres-
sive conduct is deemed necessary to protect the life or well-being of
the defendant or another.
121
One situation exists, however, where justification statutes do not
require that the victim be the initial aggressor. This is in the area of
justified use of corporal punishment by parents. When a parent
strikes a child, the child need not be the initial aggressor, and the par-
ent need not fear for his safety. In this instance the aggressive con-
duct of the defendant parent is deemed to be acceptable if the victim
child is acting in an inappropriate manner.122
C. Common-Law Influence
As might be expected, the number of ways in which the states
choose to define and implement the parental defense is subject to va-
riation and nuance, but without question the privilege is an extension
of early common-law doctrines. Indeed, it is reasonable to say that
the dominating legal force behind the contemporary privilege is the
common law.
One of the most succinct statements of the early common-law de-
fense is contained in Blackstone's Commentaries. Highlighting the
concept of moderation it is noted that, "battery is, in some cases, justi-
fiable or lawful; as where one who hath authority, a parent or a
master, gives moderate correction to his child, his scholar, or his ap-
119. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1985); GEORGE E. Dix & M. MICHAEL SHARLOT,
CRIMINAL LAW 759 (4th ed. 1996).
120. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05; Dix & SHARLOT, supra note 119, at 786.
121. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 explanatory note; see id. § 3.05 explanatory note.
122. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-24 (1993) (stating that parental force is appropriate to
"maintain discipline" or to "promote the welfare" of the child); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-5
(Michie 1994) (stating that a parent may use force to "restrain or correct his child" if such con-
duct is necessary because of the "misconduct of such child" or the child's failure to "obey the
lawful command" of the parent).
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prentice. '12 3 Later, in the mid-nineteenth century, James Kent in his
work, Commentaries on American Law, addressed the scope of the
privilege by explaining:
The rights of parents result from their duties. As they are bound
to maintain and educate their children, the law has given them a
right to such authority; and in the support of that authority, a
right to the exercise of such discipline as may be requisite for the
discharge of their sacred trust.
124
This explanation of the parental privilege places emphasis upon pa-
rental authority and the responsibilities attached thereto.
From these seminal principles, courts treat the defense as devel-
oping along two divergent paths. The first approach focuses upon
whether the parental conduct was motivated by malice. Malice in
these decisions is commonly defined in one of two ways: the first be-
ing parental aggression undertaken without a parental purpose; the
second being parental conduct that resulted in death, or serious or
permanent injury to the child. 125 These cases hold that in the absence
of malice, parents had almost unfettered discretion to physically domi-
nate their children.1 26
The second approach articulates a standard based upon a deter-
mination of whether the force utilized was reasonable or moderate.2 7
There are two hallmarks of this approach. First, commonly the terms
"reasonable" and "moderate" are undefined and are evaluated by. the
fact finder within the context of the circumstances presented.128 Sec-
123. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
120 (1768); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 440
(Oxford Reprint 1966) (stating that a parent "may lawfully correct his child, being under age, in
a reasonable manner. For this is for the benefit of his education.").
124. JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 203-05 (11th ed. 1867).
125. See, e.g., Holmes v. State, 39 So. 569, 570 (Ala. 1905) (noting that one with parental
authority may exercise that authority to the same extent as a parent so long as it is without
"malice or wicked motives"); State v. Jones, 95 N.C. 588, 592 (1886) (noting that the state will
not interfere with family government except "in cases where permanent or malicious injury is
inflicted or threatened"); State v. Lutz, 113 N.E.2d 757 (Ohio C.P. 1953) (noting that a teacher's
paddling of a pupil does not constitute a crime unless the state can show it was administered with
malice).
126. See State v. Straight, 347 P.2d 482, 490 (Mont. 1959) (rejecting the malice approach, the
court stated, "[slome cases in other jurisdictions go as far as to say that one standing in loco
parentis acts in a quasi-judicial capacity and has almost unlimited discretion regarding the pun-
ishment of the child entrusted to his care").
127. See People v. Stewart, 10 Cal. Rptr. 217, 219 (Ct. App. 1961) (finding that a parent may
use reasonable punishment, but when he "does so willfully he commits a battery"); People v.
Curtiss, 300 P. 801, 804 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1931) (finding that the statute condemned
the infliction of pain that could not be justified as reasonable); State v. Straight, 347 P.2d 482,
489 (Mont. 1959) (stating that any force used must be in a reasonable manner and moderate
degree); State v. Spiegel, 270 P. 1064, 1065 (Wyo. 1928) (stating that punishment within parental
duty must not exceed the bounds of moderation).
128. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 406 P.2d 208, 222 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965) (allowing jury to deter-
mine reasonableness); State v. Straight, 347 P.2d 482, 490 (Mont. 1959) ("It is up to the jury to
determine from the facts and circumstances of each individual case whether the manner [of
restraining or correcting the child] is reasonable and the degree moderate."); State v. Thorpe,
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ond, the force utilized need not rise to the level of serious injury to fall
outside the scope of the defense. 129 The logic of dividing the develop-
ment of the defense on the basis of whether malice is required or not
is well founded upon the language of the early opinions, as well as the
modern adaptations of these common-law approaches. Yet, in a cer-
tain sense, this analysis seems to be incomplete.
Often what seems to be at play is the tension created by the
search for standards that balance the two guiding forces behind the
privilege: family autonomy and the well-being of the child. In juris-
dictions using the malice standard or variations thereof, great defer-
ence is given to the authority of parents to raise children as they see
fit. Parental authority dominates the concern for the physical well-
being of the child. As such, in all but the worst cases of abuse, when
the child is subjected to conduct that could or does result in death,
serious injury, or disfigurement, a parent's right to discipline is given
priority over the consequences to the child. 130
In contrast, jurisdictions not using the malice standard appear to
value the well-being of the child over the authority of parents. That is
to say, because the imposed standard uses reasonableness as the
guidepost, rather than a specific outside boundary, the fact finder is
allowed to evaluate conduct that would not be evaluated by the fact
finder under the malice standard. 3' In jurisdictions that reject the
malice standard, the range of conduct that falls outside the parameter
of the defense is enlarged, parental authority is reined in, and con-
cerns for the well-being of the child are enhanced.
Regardless of how the dichotomy between these two lines of
cases is cast, it is clear that the common law continues to serve as the
focal point for modern application of the privilege. That the common
law is a pervasive influence is evidenced by the fact that while approx-
imately half the states have statutes establishing a parental defense,
the remaining states rely on case-law precedent to define the scope of
the privilege. 32 Commonly, in states that can be classified as utilizing
the common-law approach, 33 no specific statutory reference, in the
criminal context, is made. In some instances the reliance on common
429 A.2d 785, 788 (R.I. 1981) (allowing the jury to decide what is reasonable); Carpenter v.
Commonwealth, 44 S.E.2d 419, 424-25 (Va. 1947) (same).
129. See, e.g., Straight, 347 P.2d at 490 (finding that the jury should determine whether the
punishment was reasonable and moderate in light of several factors, including whether the pun-
ishment inflicted permanent or temporary injuries and the extent of the injuries).
130. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 95 N.C. 588, 592 (1886) (finding that family government is
"recognized by our law as being as complete in itself as the State government is in itself[,] and
... we will not interfere with ... it ... unless in cases where permanent or malicious injury is
inflicted or threatened, or the condition of the party is intolerable").
131. See, e.g., Bowers v. State, 389 A.2d 341, 348-49 (Md. 1978); Straight, 347 P.2d at 489-90.
132. See infra Appendix.
133. See, e.g., People v. Jennings, 641 P.2d 276, 279 (Colo. 1982) (en banc) (discussing the
common-law privilege to discipline); Anderson v. State, 487 A.2d 294, 300-01 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1984) (same).
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law is addressed in a general justification statute, asserting that con-
duct authorized pursuant to the common law continues to serve as a
valid defense to criminal conduct.13
4
D. Statutory Enactments
The second category of states have codified the common-law pa-
rental privilege via statutory enactment. 135 The statutory approach
takes two forms. The first and most common approach includes the
parental privilege as one of several defenses to all crimes where the
use of force is at issue.136 In states where the parental defense is in-
cluded in justification statutes of general application, the defense may
be asserted whenever a parent is charged with a crime involving the
use of force against his or her child.'37
In some states the defense is not included in justification statutes
of general application. Rather, the parental privilege is codified only
in respect to a particular violation of law, for example, child or domes-
tic abuse. 38 When the privilege is set out within the framework of a
particular crime, the defense is in effect, not a defense, but rather an
134. See infra Appendix. A number of examples of this approach can be found. For exam-
ple, in Wyoming a statute abolishing common-law crimes specifically indicates that common-law
defenses are retained. See WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-102 (Michie 1997). Thus, once the court
recognizes the common-law defense of parental authority this general statute encompasses the
defense. See Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263, 269-70 (Wyo. 1985). In Indiana the general justifica-
tion statute indicates that "[a] person is justified in engaging in conduct otherwise prohibited if
he has legal authority to do so." IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-1 (West 1976).
135. Even in states that have adopted statutory standards for application of the defense, the
statutes do not repeal the common law. See, e.g., Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-102 (retaining com-
mon-law defenses). In the absence of a stated intent to repeal the common-law defense as it
existed within the state at the time of enactment, such statutes should be read as codifying ex-
isting doctrines. See People v. Jennings, 641 P.2d 276, 279 (Colo. 1982) (en bane) (noting that
Colorado has codified the common-law parental corporal punishment privilege); People v.
Franklin, 433 N.Y.S.2d 482, 485 (App. Div. 1980) (Mangano, J:, dissenting) (noting that New
York has codified the common-law parental right to discipline with corporal punishment that is
reasonable and moderate). This means that the statutes are interpreted in light of common-law
principles and to the greatest extent possible harmonized with case precedent. See Anderson v.
State, 487 A.2d 294, 300-01 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (discussing overlap between child abuse
statute and common-law parental defense). Because no state has specifically abrogated the com-
mon-law right of a parent to use disciplinary physical force the common law continues to provide
guidance to the courts even in those states that have codified the defense.
136. See infra Appendix.
137. See infra Appendix.
138. For example, in Rhode Island a child abuse statute makes it a crime to inflict either
serious physical injury or serious bodily injury. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-9-5.3 (1995). Serious
bodily injury is defined as conduct creating a risk of death or permanent injury. See id. § 11-9-
5.3(2). Serious physical injury is defined as any injury other than serious bodily injury "which
arises other than from the imposition of nonexcessive corporal punishment." Id. In Michigan,
the child abuse statute contains a specific provision which indicates that "[tihis section shall not
be construed to prohibit a parent or guardian, or other person permitted by law or authorized by
the parent or guardian, from taking steps to reasonably discipline a child, including the use of
reasonable force." MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.136b(6) (West 1991). In Illinois, it is a crime
to cause, without legal justification, great bodily harm or permanent disability to a child under 13.
See 720 ILL. COMe. STAT. ANN. 5/12-4.3 (West Supp. 1997).
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element of the crime. 39 In such a situation, the state has the burden
of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the conduct was not law-
ful discipline. If, however, the parent is not charged with a crime that
incorporates the defense, the common-law defense may be asserted. 40
E. Elements of the Defense
Whether a state implements the parental privilege to use discipli-
nary force through the common law or statutory enactment, certain
commonalities exist. The commonalities may be procedural 4 or sub-
stantive in nature. The first substantive principle of universal applica-
tion is that the person inflicting the punishment must be a parent or
someone standing "in loco parentis."' 42 Both statutory language and
court interpretation of this requirement vary from state to state. Fre-
quently, statutes have expansive definitions of the parental require-
ment that include any "person responsible for the child's welfare,"' 43
"person entrusted with the care of the child,"'" or "anyone who has
139. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ArN. 5/12-4.3; MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.136b(6).
140. See, e.g., People v. Green, 119 N.W. 1087, 1090 (Mich. 1909) (affirming conviction, but
allowing parents to administer reasonable punishment).
141. One procedural matter common to most jurisdictions is that establishment of the de-
fense is generally treated as a matter of fact. See People v. Whitehurst, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 33-35
(Ct. App. 1992) (reversing conviction because court improperly failed sua sponte to instruct the
jury on the parental defense and indicating that defense must be evaluated by jury under circum-
stances presented); LaPann v. State, 382 S.E.2d 200, 201 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (affirming convic-
tion for aggravated assault to a child, the court indicated question of whether reasonable force
was used is "particularly within the province of the trier of fact"); State v. Black, 227 S.W.2d
1006, 1010 (Mo. 1950) (reviewing the issue of whether the punishment imposed was excessive,
the court indicated that the question of whether punishment is excessive "is not a conclusion of
law but a question of fact for the determination of the jury"). As such, the fact finder, be it judge
or jury, must decide, based upon the facts and circumstances presented, whether the conduct of
the defendant falls within the scope of the privilege. A second procedural issue is that the de-
fense is commonly treated as an affirmative defense. If it is treated as an affirmative defense, the
burden of raising the privilege is placed upon the defendant. Once the defense has been as-
serted, however, the state assumes the burden of persuasion and must establish beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant's conduct was not justified. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 714 P.2d 884,
886-87 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (reversing defendant's conviction for child abuse because the trial
court failed to properly instruct jury on parental defense). The court indicated that as an affirm-
ative defense a defendant need only raise reasonable doubt as to existence of the parental de-
fense, then the state must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's conduct was
justified. See id. at 886.
142. In a general sense the term "in loco parentis" is meant to apply to those who have
assumed the duties and responsibilities characteristically assumed by parents toward their chil-
dren. See Fuller v. Fuller, 418 F.2d 1189, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Niewiadomski v. United States,
159 F.2d 683, 686 (6th Cir. 1947); Martin v. United States, 452 A.2d 360, 362 (D.C. 1982); see also
ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 987 (2d ed. 1969) (indicating that the parental defense
extends to adoptive parents or to adults who have taken children into their family without for-
mal adoption).
143. For example, Wisconsin permits reasonable discipline by "a person responsible for the
child's welfare." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.45(5) (West 1996). This phrase is defined as including
"the child's parent or guardian,.., or any other person legally responsible for the child's welfare
in a residential setting." Id.
144. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-403(1) (West 1989); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-
605(1) (Michie 1987) ("A parent, teacher, or guardian or other person entrusted with the care
and supervision of a minor .... ").
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express or implied consent of the parent."' 45 Whether in a common-
law or statutory jurisdiction, the term is given broad application be-
cause the requirement centers around the assumption of responsibility
for the well-being of the child rather than biological affinity.' 46 In the
absence of a relationship creating such responsibility, an inference
that the use of force is for the purpose of promoting the best interests
of the child is at best attenuated.
A second substantive principle excludes application of the de-
fense to situations involving parents and their adult offspring. Statu-
tory language commonly extends the privilege to acts of aggression
toward the "child"' 47 or the "minor. "148 Some states limit the doc-
trine to victims under a certain age.149 This limitation again corre-
sponds with the assumption that the individual utilizing force has
assumed responsibility for controlling the conduct of another. This
premise has no place in relationships between parents and their adult
offspring.
150
In what could be called the parental purpose requirement, the
third universal principle is that the force must be used for the benefit
of the child.15' That is to say, the act of force must fulfill a parental
145. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.61(1)(b) (West 1994). This statute allows the use of force
by the child's parent, stepparent, or someone acting in loco parentis. The term "in loco parentis"
is defined as a "grandparent and guardian, any person acting by, through, or under the direction
of a court ... and anyone who has express or implied consent of the parent or parents." Id.
146. Discussion of this issue commonly occurs in cases involving live-in relationships, step-
parents, or boyfriends. When disciplinary force has been used by someone falling into this cate-
gory, the court may use the lack of a parental relationship to exclude the defendant from the
protection provided by the defense. See United States v. Ward, 39 M.J. 1085, 1088 (A.C.M.R.
1994) (finding that a live-in boyfriend was not able to rely on the defense because he had not
assumed responsibility for the care and supervision of child); Dayton v. State, 501 N.E.2d 482,
484 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that while a stepfather was a custodian, not all custodians have
the right to use corporal punishment); Wood v. Texas, No. A14-87-00940-CR, 1988 WL 126935,
at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston (14 Dist.) Dec. 1, 1988) (court rule states that this case may not be
cited as authority) (finding that live-in boyfriend was not acting in loco parentis because he
exceeded the disciplinary measures outlined by the mother). But see Keser v. State, 706 P.2d
263, 265 (Wyo. 1985) (indicating that a stepfather was entitled to assert defense).
147. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-3-107 (1997) (allowing parent to use force to correct a
"child"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.45 (West 1996) (authorizing reasonable discipline of a "child" as
defined in § 948.01(1)).
148. See ALA. CODE § 13A-3-24 (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53A-18 (West 1994);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:6 (1996).
149. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.430 (Michie 1996) (authorizing use of force on a child under
18); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.10 (McKinney 1998) (authorizing use of force on person under the
age of 21).
150. Allowing the use of force on a person who is under the age of 21 as outlined by the
New York statute cited above seems to be stretching, to a questionable maximum, the limits of
the age range where parental disciplinary force is appropriate.
151. See Anderson v. State, 487 A.2d 294, 298 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (noting that re-
ported decisions routinely fail to discuss the parental purpose requirement and instead focus on
the amount of force used by the parents). This is an accurate statement in that courts appear to
assume without discussion that the force was used for a disciplinary purpose even when
presented with circumstances that might suggest otherwise. See Commonwealth v. Ogin, 540
A.2d 549 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (upholding conviction based on three incidents in which the child
did not appear to be misbehaving at the time of the abuse); cf. United States v. Arnold, 40 M.J.
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obligation attendant to the upbringing of the child.152 The language
used to denote the purpose requirement is often reflected by the phra-
seology that the force must be used for the purpose of discipline or to
promote the welfare of the child.153 As will be recalled, the absence
of parental purpose was one of the two ways in which malice could be
established under the malice approach. However, whether or not a
malice standard is being utilized, the parental purpose requirement is
universally mandated. This restriction means that random or gratui-
tous acts of violence toward children are not encompassed by the
defense.
F. The Variables
The final two characteristics of the defense center around an eval-
uation of the necessity for using force and a restriction on the amount
of force that may be used. As with the purpose requirement, every
jurisdiction places some type of limit on the amount of force that is
permissible. Some jurisdictions require only that the amount of force
be reasonable; 154 others exclude force that is designed to cause or
known to create a substantial risk of death, serious physical injury,
disfigurement, extreme pain or emotional distress, or gross degrada-
tion.155  A limited number of statutory states exclude only deadly
force.156 At the opposite end of the spectrum, the justification statute
in one state excludes conduct that results in physical injury to the
744, 745 (A.F.C.M.R. 1994). In Arnold the defendant asserted that his plea of guilty should be
set aside. The basis of his claim was that in the course of disciplining his one-month-old baby, he
accidently caused the baby to suffer a subdural hematoma. See Arnold, 40 M.J. at 745. The
defense of accident required establishment of three elements, one of which was that the defend-
ant was engaged in an act not prohibited by law. See id. In analyzing this issue the court noted
that the defendant appeared to meet this criterion. See id. at 746. In doing so, the court stated:
[I]t is axiomatic that a parent is authorized, and in fact expected, to discipline his children,
although one must question whether the cognitive ability of a 1-month-old infant is suffi-
ciently developed to derive any benefit whatsoever from such "discipline." However, giving
the appellant the benefit of the doubt, we will assume, without deciding, that his actions did
not violate any law ....
Id.
152. E.g., People v. Green, 119 N.W. 1087, 1090 (Mich. 1909) (indicating that a parent "who
acts in good faith, honestly thinking what he does is for the benefit of the child" will not be
subjected to legal intervention); Commonwealth v. Krammer, 371 A.2d 1008, 1011 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1977) (indicating that disciplinary force must be used "with an attitude of proper parental
responsibility for teaching the child right from wrong").
153. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-703 (1990) (allowing a parent to use force to the extent
necessary to "maintain discipline or promote the welfare of the minor"); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 509(1)(i) (West 1983) ("the force is used for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the
welfare of the minor, including the preventing or punishment of his misconduct").
154. See infra Appendix.
155. See id. This approach is drawn from the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 3.08 (1985).
156. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.430 (Michie 1996) (allowing parents to "use reasonable and
appropriate nondeadly force"); N.J. REV. STAT. 2C:3-8(c) (1995) (excluding deadly force unless
it is "otherwise justifiable under the provisions of this chapter"); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.10 (Con-
sol. 1998) (allowing "force, but not deadly force"); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.61 (West 1994)
("The use of force, but not deadly force, . . . against a child is justified .... "); infra Appendix.
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child,' 57 and another limits the defense to that which does not "cause
bodily harm greater than transient pain or minor temporary
marks.", 58
The necessity factor is based upon an evaluation of the propor-
tionality of the disciplinary force used to the conduct of the child. As
such, it requires a comparison of the punishment imposed and the
conduct that warranted the punishment. In making this assessment,
the court evaluates circumstances surrounding the imposed punish-
ment including such factors as the size, age, sex, physical condition,
sensitivity, character, and conduct of the child.' 59 The interjection of
necessity as a factor of consideration requires subjective analysis of
the parent-child relationship. It mandates an assessment of whether
the parent could or should have used other means of correction, and
whether the child was or was not deserving of the response. The
states treat the necessity requirement in three ways: they do not eval-
uate necessity; or they evaluate necessity from either an objective or
subjective perspective. 60
It is within the confines of these two issues, force and necessity,
that the greatest variations exist. Whether in a common-law or statu-
tory jurisdiction, it is the interplay and interpretation of these vari-
ables that results in differing standards for application of the privilege.
As the statutory states typically mirror common-law standards, legisla-
tive attempts to balance the factors of force and necessity serve as a
good guide to the approaches utilized throughout the United States.
Several statutory approaches are found.
157. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 468 (1995) ("The force shall not be justified if it includes,
but is not limited to, any of the following: Throwing the child, kicking, burning, cutting, striking
with a closed fist, interfering with breathing, use of or threatened use of a deadly weapon, pro-
longed deprivation of sustenance or medication, or doing any other act that is likely to cause or
does cause physical injury, disfigurement, mental distress, unnecessary degradation or substantial
risk of serious physical injury or death ...." (emphasis added)).
158. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.100 (West Supp. 1994) ("The following actions are
presumed unreasonable when used to correct or restrain a child: (1) Throwing, kicking, burning,
or cutting a child; (2) striking a child with a closed fist; (3) shaking a child under age three; (4)
interfering with a child's breathing; (5) threatening a child with a deadly weapon; or (6) doing
any other act that is likely to cause and which does cause bodily harm greater than transient pain
or minor temporary marks." (emphasis added)).
159. E.g., State v. Hunt, 406 P.2d 208, 222 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965) (reasoning that the degree
of punishment should relate to the specific child's characteristics); State v. Thorpe, 429 A.2d 785,
788 (R.I. 1981) (finding that the degree of acceptable corporal punishment must be evaluated in
terms of the "sensitivity and character of the child, the child's age, sex, physical condition");
Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 44 S.E.2d 419, 424-25 (Va. 1947) (finding that corporal punishment
must be evaluated by examining the specific characteristics of the child, the child's misconduct,
and the nature and type of injury inflicted on the child).
160. See infra Appendix. When states evaluate necessity from a subjective perspective, the
issue of importance is whether the fact finder determines that the defendant believed the punish-
ment was necessary. Evidence of this nature, supporting a contention that the punishment was
necessary, is most apt to come from the defendant. Because it is unlikely that a defendant as-
serting the defense would maintain that the punishment was not necessary, in terms of practical
application, states that only require a subjective determination of necessity are indistinguishable
from states that do not evaluate necessity.
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Several states require that both the amount of force used and the
necessity of using the force be judged by an objective standard of rea-
sonableness . 61 The parental privilege as enacted by the Colorado leg-
islature contains characteristic statutory language for a state following
this approach.162 The Colorado statute reads:
The use of physical force upon another person which would
otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal
under any of the following circumstances:
(a) A parent, guardian, or other person entrusted with the care
and supervision of a minor... may use reasonable and appropri-
ate physical force upon the minor.., when and to the extent it is
reasonably necessary and appropriate to maintain discipline or
promote the welfare of the minor .... 163
As indicated by this language, the statute requires both that the
force be reasonable and that it be reasonably necessary. In statutory
states and common-law jurisdictions, the parameters of reasonable
force and reasonable necessity are factual questions to be evaluated in
light of common-law standards. 164
The second type of statutory enactment is based upon the Model
Penal Code. Section 3.08 of the Model Penal Code states:
The use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifi-
able if:
(1) the actor is the parent or guardian or other person similarly
responsible for the general care and supervision of a minor or a
person acting at the request of such parent, guardian or other re-
sponsible person and:
(a) the force is used for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting
the welfare of the minor, including the prevention or punishment
of his misconduct; and
(b) the force used is not designed to cause or known to create a
substantial risk of causing death, serious bodily injury, disfigure-
ment, extreme pain or mental distress or gross degradation
165
Under the Model Penal Code approach, the statutory language
does not address the issue of necessity, nor does it include a specific
mandate that the amount of force used be reasonable. Comments to
161. See infra Appendix.
162. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-703 (West 1990).
163. Id.
164. See infra Appendix. A variation on this approach is utilized in several states. These
states require that the amount of force utilized be reasonable. With respect to necessity, how-
ever, the statutory language requires that the actor reasonably believe that the use of force was
necessary. Thus, the fact finder must find that the actor believed that the force was necessary
and that this belief was reasonable. Because the actor's belief must meet an objective determi-
nation of reasonableness, this variation, from a practical perspective, is indistinguishable from
the Colorado approach. Examples are found in Alabama, Connecticut, Maine, and Oregon. See
infra Appendix.
165. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08 (1985); see infra Appendix.
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this section indicate that "so long as a parent uses moderate force for
permissible purposes, the criminal law should not provide for review
of the reasonableness of the parents judgment." '166 In contrast to the
states requiring reasonable force, the language of the Model Penal
Code clearly defines the amount of force that is not permitted. This
limitation restricts parents from using force that is designed to cause
or known to create a substantial risk of causing death, serious physical
injury, disfigurement, extreme pain, mental distress, or gross degrada-
tion. In effect, this limitation provides that conduct resulting in one of
the listed factors is never moderate. Conversely, because neither ne-
cessity nor reasonableness is specifically evaluated, any force, utilized
for a disciplinary purpose, that falls short of the enumerated conse-
quences is protected. 16
7
The third statutory approach utilized can be classified as a com-
bined approach.168 Jurisdictions using the combined approach can be
divided into subgroups. In what might be considered a true combined
approach, the first variation mandates that the force be reasonable
and reasonably necessary, and it includes Model Penal Code language
that places an outer limit on the amount of lawful force.16 9 A second
subgroup using the combined approach is similar to the first in that
these states require that the force used must be reasonable and mod-
erate and, as in the Model Penal Code, an outer limit on appropriate
force is established.17° In these jurisdictions, however, specific acts
are excluded from the protection offered by the defense. 171 Most im-
portantly, and in contrast to the Model Penal Code, the boundary
used to distinguish lawful from unlawful force is neither death nor
166. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08 cmt.2.
167. The Model Penal Code approach is similar to a strict malice approach in that it pro-
vides explicit language indicating parental conduct that is not lawful discipline. It also uses simi-
lar factors such as death, serious injury, and disfigurement to define prohibited conduct. See id.
§ 3.08(1)(b). It is, however, distinguishable from a strict malice approach. The strict malice
approach evaluates the result of the conduct. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 95 N.C. 588, 588 (1886). If
the child was killed, seriously injured, or disfigured, the conduct was not protected. The Model
Penal Code language necessitates an evaluation of the parental conduct and whether it was
known to cause an injury, or created a substantial risk that such an injury could occur. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(1)(b). If such a risk is created, the conduct is arguably not pro-
tected even if serious injury does not result. Thus, the malice approach focuses upon the conse-
quence to the child, while the Model Penal Code approach evaluates the parental conduct and
its potential for harm. It should be noted, however, that even under the malice approach, con-
duct that did not have a physical consequence could be determined to be unprotected if the
discipline was administered without a parental purpose. See Moakley v. State, 547 So. 2d 1246
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
168. See infra Appendix.
169. The result of combining the two approaches is a standard that has three prongs: (1) the
punishment must be reasonable; (2) it must be reasonably necessary; and (3) it must not be
known to cause or create a substantial risk of the enumerated consequences. See ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 106 (West 1983); Wis. STAT. § 939.45 (1996). The language of these
statutes would indicate that if the parental conduct fails to meet even one of the prongs, then the
conduct of the defendant would not be encompassed by the defense.
170. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 468 (1995); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.100 (1988).
171. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 468 (1995); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.100 (1988).
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serious physical injury. In two jurisdictions, Washington172 and Dela-
ware,17 3 the justification defense specifically excludes conduct result-
ing in physical injury or in bodily harm greater than transient pain or
minor temporary marks. The effect of the language utilized in these
two jurisdictions is to articulate a standard that preserves the parental
authority to use corporal punishment, while at the same time setting
forth a standard that clearly eliminates from the defense parental ag-
gression that results in physical injury. This approach is significantly
different from the approach utilized in states that set the outside pa-
rameter of parental aggression at death or serious physical injury. In
Washington and Delaware, the common-law concept of moderation is
defined so as to restrict parental aggression. 74 In the other states us-
ing the combined approach, the concept of reasonableness is arguably
expanded by the use of the malice or Model Penal Code parameters
to give context to the meaning of reasonable or moderate
punishment. 75
No matter which approach is utilized, the ultimate goal is to pro-
vide a standard by which parents can physically punish children with-
172. The Washington statute provides:
It is the policy of this state to protect children from assault and abuse and to encourage
parents, teachers, and their authorized agents to use methods of correction and restraint of
children that are not dangerous to the children. However, the physical discipline of a child
is not unlawful when it is reasonable and moderate and is inflicted by a parent, teacher, or
guardian for the purposes of restraining or correcting the child. Any use of force on a child
by any other person is unlawful unless it is reasonable and moderate and is authorized in
advance by the child's parent or guardian for purposes of restraining or correcting the child.
The following actions are presumed unreasonable when used to correct or restrain a
child: (1) Throwing, kicking, burning or cutting a child; (2) striking a child with a closed fist;
(3) shaking a child under age three; (4) interfering with a child's breathing; (5) threatening a
child with a deadly weapon; or (6) doing any other act that is likely to cause and which does
cause bodily harm greater than transient pain or minor temporary marks. The age, size, and
condition of the child and the location of the injury shall be considered when determining
whether the bodily harm is reasonable or moderate. This list is illustrative of unreasonable
actions and is not intended to be exclusive.
WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.100 (emphasis added).
173. The Delaware statute provides:
The use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable if it is reasonable and
moderate and: (1) The defendant is the parent, guardian, foster parent, legal custodian or
other person similarly responsible for the general care and supervision of a child, or a per-
son acting at the request of a parent .... and, (a) The force is used for the purpose of
safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the child, including the prevention or punishment
of misconduct; and (b) The force used is intended to benefit the child .... The size, age,
condition of the child, location of the force and the strength and duration of the force shall
be factors considered in determining whether the force used is reasonable and moderate;
but (c) The force shall not be justified if it includes, but is not limited to any of the following:
Throwing the child, kicking, burning, cutting, striking with a closed fist, interfering with
breathing, use of or threatened use of a deadly weapon, prolonged deprivation of suste-
nance or medication, or doing any other act that is likely to cause or does cause physical
injury, disfigurement, mental distress, unnecessary degradation or substantial risk of serious
physical injury or death ....
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 468 (1995) (emphasis added).
174. See id.; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.100 (authorizing force only when used "for
purposes of restraining or correcting the child").
175. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 106 (West 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.45 (West
1996 & Supp. 1997).
[Vol. 1998
HeinOnline  -- 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 444 1998
PARENTAL CORPORAL PUNISHMENT DEFENSE
out criminal sanction, while at the same time protecting children from
punishment that is excessive in nature. It can be speculated that cur-
rent standards work well at accomplishing this goal when the parental
conduct in question falls at the outer edges of disciplinary force.
A review of the cases evaluating the defense, as well as the stat-
utes that define it, indicates that current standards protect children
from truly egregious discipline. If a child suffers a permanent injury,
disfigurement, or death, parents are not protected by the defense.176
Their conduct is excluded from the defense umbrella because it is
either specifically precluded, as in the Model Penal Code, or it falls so
far outside the realm of reasonable punishment that reliance on the
defense is doomed to failure.
At the other end of the spectrum, it can be speculated that the
privilege is working well to protect parents from criminal sanction for
physically inconsequential acts of force. As the Model Penal Code
shields conduct resulting in physical injury, then certainly acts not re-
sulting in physical injury will normally be protected. 177 Under the rea-
sonable, moderate, and necessary jurisdictions, acts of inconsequential
force are arguably subject to review by the fact finder. Two factors,
however, would indicate that this standard is adequate to protect par-
ents from nonphysically invasive discipline. First, excepting high-risk
circumstances, it seems unlikely under most circumstances that disci-
pline having no physical consequence would be deemed to be unrea-
sonable. Second, the almost total absence of reported decisions
dealing solely with instances of discipline with a nonphysical conse-
quence provides at least anecdotal evidence that parents are not being
prosecuted for using force that is inconsequential. 178
Before leaving this point, one observation should be made con-
cerning the use of reported decisions to assess the viability of the pa-
rental privilege. This point revolves around the fact that appellate
review in the criminal context generally follows the conviction of the
defendant. 79 The state has no right to appeal a judgment of acquittal.
Therefore, the reported decisions generally deal with instances when
176. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(1)(b) (1985).
177. Note, however, that under the Model Penal Code, acts that have no physical conse-
quence but pose a substantial risk of the listed factors are excluded from the defense. See id.
178. See Hinkle v. State, 26 N.E. 777 (Ind. 1891). This appears to be one of the few reported
cases dealing with the imposition of corporal punishment that did not result in some type of
physical injury. In Hinkle the father chained his daughter to a sewing machine and left her there
for an extended period of time. See id. at 778. Other cases frequently include a description of
parental conduct that has both a physical and a nonphysical consequence, but it is rare to see the
latter unaccompanied by the former. See also Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir.
1958) (involving a charge where the child was chained and did not suffer any physical injury,
however, the case did not involve application of the parental defense).
179. As will be noted in the discussion of the void-for-vagueness cases in the next section,
the state does have the opportunity to seek appellate review when the lower court dismisses an
indictment or information based upon the premise that the criminal statute at issue is unconstitu-
tional. See infra Part IV.A.
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the fact finder did not believe that the disciplinary force used was law-
ful. There is no empirical research or statistical database analyzing
cases where the defendant has been acquitted because he successfully
asserted the parental defense. Thus, if the case analysis is skewed, the
suspected imbalance would tip towards the assumption that the de-
fense is doing a better job of protecting parental autonomy, and a less
effective job of protecting children, than the reported cases would im-
ply. Although the picture presented is thus in some aspects incom-
plete, it is not unreasonable to assume that fact finders grapple with
the issues presented in much the same manner as do the courts.
With this caveat in mind, it is in the realm of parent-child physical
contact falling between egregious and mild punishment that is prob-
lematic. An examination of the cases that address the assertion of the
parental corporal punishment privilege points toward the difficulties
posed by current standards when parental punishment falls between
these two extremes.
IV. CASE-LAW DISCUSSION
When the parental corporal punishment defense has been as-
serted at trial, claims of insufficiency of evidence, and vagueness or
overbreadth challenges are two of the most frequently asserted
grounds on appeal. 8 ° Both of these areas highlight the need to ex-
amine the privilege and its impact on parents and children.
A. Challenges Based on Vagueness and Overbreadth
In the criminal context, due process protections afforded by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments stand at the heart of a vagueness
challenge. The Due Process Clauses have been interpreted to require
fair notice; thus, "no one may be required at peril of life, liberty or
property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are en-
titled to be informed of what the state commands or forbids."'181
180. Claims based on instructional challenge are also frequently asserted. Although these
cases raise interesting issues, the idiosyncratic nature of the instructing process make a compara-
tive analysis of the manner in which states treat the corporal punishment privilege difficult.
Compare State v. Nevels, 609 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (reversing because the lower
court failed to instruct on parental defense), with People v. Whitehurst, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 35
(Ct. App. 1992) (reversing conviction because court failed sua sponte to instruct on parental
defense), and People v. Hoehl, 568 P.2d 484, 487 (Colo. 1977) (reversing and remanding for
failure to instruct on the meaning of the phrase "without justifiable excuse" as defined by paren-
tal justification statute), and State v. Torrice, 564 A.2d 330, 335 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989) (finding
that the court does not have sua sponte duty to instruct on parental defense). As such, the most
fertile grounds for analysis center around appeals based upon claims of vagueness and insuffi-
ciency of evidence.
181. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); see also Dunn v. United States, 442
U.S. 100, 112 (1979) (holding that the defendant's interview did not meet the requisite formality
required by the statute); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) (stating that in the First
Amendment context, the degree of specificity is greater).
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When a criminal statute is challenged as being unconstitutionally
vague, the focus of the court centers around the concept of notice.
Fair notice has two components, both of which emanate from the
proposition that criminal statutes must be drafted so that "men of
common intelligence need not guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. 18 2 In the first instance, this means that the statute must
inform those charged with an offense that their conduct is criminal.183
In the second, the statute must provide intelligible standards for en-
forcement. Those who enforce the law-police officers, judges, and
juries-must receive sufficient direction from the statutory language
in order to assess whether the conduct of the defendant falls within
the scope of the offense. 84 In the absence of clear direction, those
who enforce the law will be called upon to determine important mat-
ters of policy that appropriately belong to the legislative branch.
185
A second constitutional concern, similar to, but distinct from,
challenges based on the void-for-vagueness doctrine, revolves around
the issue of substantial overbreadth. 8 6 When a criminal statute is al-
leged to be overbroad, the courts focus on whether the statutory lan-
guage encompasses not only conduct that is legitimately criminalized,
but also conduct that is entitled to constitutional protection.187 If the
statute is so sweeping that it inhibits protected conduct, it is said to
have a chilling effect on rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments and thus is fatally overbroad. 188
With these principles in mind, several initial points should be
made in conjunction with a review of the cases dealing with the paren-
tal defense. First, challenges based on vagueness or overbreadth fre-
quently occur when the parental privilege to use disciplinary force is
included as an element of the underlying offense.' 89 Further, whether
a parent's right to use such force is incorporated into the elements of
the underlying crime or framed as a separate defense, appeals are gen-
182. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); see also Schad v. Arizona,
501 U.S. 624, 632 (1991) (stating that the practical consequence of the doctrine of vagueness is
that the defendant understands the legal basis of the charge with specificity); City of Mesquite v.
Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982) (stating that a statute is void for vagueness if its
prohibitions are not clearly defined).
183. See United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 305 (1992); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378
U.S. 347, 352 (1964); United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176-77 (1952); Pierce v. United
States, 314 U.S. 306, 311 (1941); McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
184. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972); Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963).
185. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09.
186. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112-14 (1990); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 615 (1973); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965).
187. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1948).
188. See Bowers v. State, 389 A.2d 341, 345, 346 (Md. 1978).
189. See, e.g., People v. Gregg, 520 N.W.2d 690, 692 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Keser v. State,
706 P.2d 263, 265-68 (Wyo. 1985).
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erally limited to states that define the defense as the reasonable and
moderate use of force. 190
Challenges to vagueness or overbreadth are uncommon in juris-
dictions that utilize the Model Penal Code approach or variations
thereof. Thus, when the statute clearly articulates parental conduct
that is not entitled to protection, due process challenges are rare. This
phenomenon is likely attributable to the fact that challenges based
upon vagueness or overbreadth are less tenable when the statutory
language defining the defense provides greater specificity.
Appeals based on vagueness or overbreadth in states using the
"reasonable and moderate" formulation of the defense take two
forms. In the first, the defendant does not typically limit his argument
to the vague nature of the privilege. Rather, the argument is centered
on unclear language contained in the underlying statutory offense that
calls into play the issue of a parent's right to use disciplinary force.
For example, states commonly enact child abuse statutes that make it
a crime to punish children in a manner that is "cruel," 191 "unnecessa-
rily severe, '  or "unlawful. ' ' 193 Thus, the statutory language makes
it a crime to punish a child, but only if the punishment exceeds that
which is lawful. Because the language of these statutes necessitates an
evaluation of the scope of lawful punishment, the vagueness or over-
breadth challenges to the underlying statute are intertwined with the
meaning attached to the privilege.
The second form in which such challenges arise concerns the in-
terplay between the defense and the definition of the degree of harm
specified in the underlying offense. For example, statutes designed to
protect children from abuse may make it an offense to cause "physical
harm" 194 or "unjustifiable physical pain" 195 to a child. When these
terms are either undefined or defined in a manner that arguably
crosses into the realm of lawful discipline, challenges based on vague-
ness or overbreadth are asserted.
190. But see State v. Artis, 545 N.E.2d 925, 926-27 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (reviewing an ap-
peal based on vagueness issues that involved interpretation of a statute that defined excessive
punishment as that which creates "a substantial risk of serious physical harm"). However, the
issue on appeal was whether the phrase "[t]orture or cruelly abuse" rendered the statute uncon-
stitutionally vague.
191. See Bowers, 389 A.2d at 347 (interpreting the statutory phrase "cruel or inhumane
treatment"); State v. Sinica, 372 N.w.2d 445, 448 (Neb. 1985) (interpreting the phrase "cruelly
punish").
192. See Hunter v. State, 360 N.E.2d 588, 594 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (interpreting the phrase
"inflicting unnecessarily severe corporal punishment").
193. See People v. Hicks, 386 N.W.2d 657, 660 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (interpreting "cruelly
or unlawfully punish").
194. See People v. Gregg, 520 N.W.2d 690, 691 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (discussing the Michi-
gan statute).
195. See State v. Meinert, 594 P.2d 232, 233 (Kan. 1979) (discussing the Kansas statute).
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Bowers v. State19 6 falls into the first category mentioned. This
case involved a claim of vagueness when the underlying offense pre-
cluded the infliction of "cruel or inhumane treatment. '' 197 Bowers was
the stepfather of fifteen-year-old Patricia. Because Patricia had
"played hookey" from school, the defendant struck her with a belt
fifteen to twenty times on her back, neck, arms, and legs.' 98 He was
subsequently charged with child abuse. On appeal, the defendant as-
serted that defining abuse as "cruel or inhumane treatment" repre-
sented an "unwarranted intrusion of the constitutionally protected
right of privacy in family relationships." 199 The court rejected this
argument.2 °°
An issue of significance in Bowers was whether a parent's use of
disciplinary force was entitled to the status of a constitutionally pro-
tected fundamental right.20 ' According to the court in Bowers, a
vagueness challenge not touching on a fundamental right is generally
limited to the facts before the court.20 2 In other words, the inquiry is
into whether or not this particular defendant had fair notice that his
conduct was criminal.
In contrast, if the statute in question intrudes upon the exercise of
a fundamental right, then it is incumbent on the court to review the
statute upon its face.20 3 A facial review asks whether under any rea-
sonably foreseeable circumstance, the statutory language could be de-
termined to have provided inadequate notice of the prohibited
conduct. It is "essentially a rule of standing" that allows a defendant
to complain that the language at issue is unconstitutional with regard
to others not before the court, even though it is constitutional as ap-
plied to the conduct of the defendant.204 This grant of third-party
standing is mandated because of the assumption that statutory lan-
guage that suffers from "imprecise draftsmanship" will have a chilling
impact on protected conduct.20 5 Once arriving at the conclusion that a
facial review is mandated, however, Bowers maintains that the scope
of review is the same as in the nonfundamental right situation.20 6 As
such, the focus of the court should be upon whether the language pro-
vides fair notice and adequate guidelines.20 7
196. 389 A.2d 341.
197. See id. at 344.
198. See id. at 343.
199. Id. at 346.
200. See id. at 349-50.
201. See id. at 345-46.
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Bowers noted that it was, as yet, undetermined whether a par-
ent's right to use corporal punishment is a fundamental right.2" 8 How-
ever, because the court believed that the Maryland statute could
withstand a facial review, it indicated that it was not necessary to de-
termine if the right of parents to use disciplinary force involved the
exercise of a fundamental right.2 °9
In determining that the statute in question was not vague, the
court relied first on the fact that the terms "cruel" and "inhumane"
had commonly accepted definitions.210 It then stressed the long-
standing legal recognition of a parent's right to use reasonable and
moderate punishment.21 1 Because the parameters of reasonable and
moderate punishment had been subject to refinement through the
centuries, it reasoned that the converse of reasonable and moderate-
"cruel and inhumane"-had also "acquired a relatively widely ac-
cepted connotation in the law. '212 With this premise as the bedrock of
analysis, Bowers returned to the issue of notice. The court held that
the statutory language provided fair notice to parents that the use of
force was permissible when used for correction but was not appropri-
ate when physical injury was caused cruelly.213 Moreover, it held that
the language provided clear direction to those who enforce the law
and precluded them from "reacting to nothing more than their own
subjective ideas of child discipline. 214
The court buttressed its decision by indicating that although
many child abuse statutes had been challenged for vagueness, none
had been struck down.215 It further noted that assessing statutory
vagueness does not require "mathematical precision "216 but rather a
"rough idea of fairness." '17 Finally, the court said that "[i]t is true that
the terms 'cruel or inhumane' and 'cruel mistreatment' are by nature
somewhat loose-fitting descriptions of human behavior," yet it held
that the statute represented an acceptable compromise between the
need for specific language and the need to address "a social evil of
truly inestimable proportions., 218
208. See id. at 347. The court noted that traditionally the status of a right as a "fundamental
right" has been limited to First Amendment freedoms. See id. at 346. The court further noted a
trend by state and lower federal courts to accord "fundamental right" status to "any of the
fundamental freedoms protected under the Bill of Rights." Id. at 346-47. As will be noted in the
discussion that follows, several state courts have determined that the parental right to use lawful
punishment is entitled to "fundamental right" status.
209. See id. at 347.
210. See id. at 347-48.
211. See id. at 348.
212. Id.




217. Id. (citing Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)).
218. Id. at 349-50.
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Bowers is atypical in two aspects. First, it includes a detailed
analysis of a void-for-vagueness review when the issue of a parent's
right to use disciplinary force is at issue.219 Most decisions recognizing
the parental right to use such force quickly come to the conclusion
that the statutory language provides adequate notice to defendants
that their conduct is criminal.2 °
Second, unlike Bowers, some courts do not review the statute for
facial vagueness. This results because the courts fail to address the
issue of whether the assertion of the defense involves a fundamental
right221 or, alternatively, either explicitly222 or implicitly223 hold that
the use of disciplinary force by a parent does not involve the exercise
of a fundamental right.
In one sense, this distinction should be unimportant because
Bowers tells us that even under the stricter scrutiny of a facial review,
the language "cruel mistreatment" meets the requirements of due pro-
cess.224 Yet, it is not unfair to characterize this assessment as a close
call. However, mimicking the same type of analysis used in Bowers,
other courts have determined that language such as, "unnecessarily
severe corporal punishment '225 or "unjustifiable pain and suffer-
ing," 226 also meet the requirements of due process. When courts em-
ploy a cursory analysis or fail to treat the parental use of force as a
fundamental right, the due process goals of fair notice may not have
really been met.
Conversely, Bowers, in many aspects, is a very typical decision.
First, as mentioned above, no matter the language at issue, courts typi-
cally find that the statute in question provides due process notice to
parents and fact finders.227 Second, the cases commonly involve a fac-
tual basis entailing significant injury to the child.228 Finally, the courts
seem to recognize the difficulty in resolving cases of this nature, but
reason that the need for specificity must be balanced against a very
serious social problem calling for flexible statutes that provide broad
219. See id. at 347-50.
220. See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 135 Cal. Rptr. 644, 645-46 (Ct. App. 1976); State v.
Comeaux, 319 So. 2d 897, 898-99 (La. 1975); People v. Shelton, 360 N.W.2d 234, 238 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1984).
221. See People v. Gregg, 520 N.W.2d 690, 692-93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Teubner v. State,
742 S.W.2d 57, 58-59 (Tex. App. 1987).
222. See Smith v. State, 489 N.E.2d 140, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Sinica, 372
N.W.2d 445, 449 (Neb. 1985).
223. See Hunter v. State, 360 N.E.2d 588, 595-96 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977).
224. See Bowers v. State, 389 A.2d 341, 347 (Md. 1978).
225. Hunter, 360 N.E.2d at 594.
226. State v. Comeaux, 319 So. 2d 897, 899 (La. 1975).
227. See, e.g., People v. Gregg, 520 N.W.2d 690, 691-92 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Keser v.
State, 706 P.2d 263, 268 (Wyo. 1985).
228. See, e.g., Gregg, 520 N.W.2d at 691 (involving blood blisters, bruises, and a welt).
No. 2]
HeinOnline  -- 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 451 1998
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
protection for children.22 9 Similar concerns reappear in the second
type of vagueness or overbreadth claim commonly asserted.
As mentioned at the outset of this discussion, the second common
basis for appeal in this context arises because of the lack of clear defi-
nitions with respect to the scope of harm encompassed by the underly-
ing offense. In these cases, the accused parent asserts that the
prohibited conduct is not sufficiently defined and, as such, crosses into
the realm of protected parental conduct. For example, in Keser v.
State,23 ° the defendant was charged with the crime of child abuse. The
evidence at trial established that the defendant struck his fourteen-
year-old stepson in the face with an ice scraper, slapped him in the
mouth, and beat him with a belt on the face and body because the
teenager had refused to return to the family home.2 31 One point as-
serted on appeal was that the statute in question was vague because it
defined abuse as causing "physical injury" or "mental trauma." '232 The
defendant reasoned that the lack of definitions of these terms resulted
in the inability to distinguish between child abuse and the permitted
use of corporal punishment.233
This contention was rejected. In doing so, the court noted that
similar language had been upheld and that the terms "physical injury"
and "mental trauma" were readily capable of definition.234 As such,
the court reasoned that due process notice requirements had been
met.235 It concluded by indicating that "[t]he statute is violated upon
the occurrence of physical injury and mental trauma-what society
would consider child abuse. ' 2 36 Two points of interest from this deci-
sion exist. First, Keser holds that physical injury, resulting from disci-
pline, is child abuse.2 3 7 Second, the court does not address whether
the prohibition against causing physical injury would have a chilling
effect on the parent's right to discipline.
In People v. Hicks,2 3 8 the court reviewed a consolidated appeal of
a husband and wife charged with cruelty to children. At issue was a
Michigan statute that made it a crime to habitually cause or permit the
health of a child to be injured.23 9 Hicks held that a criminal statute
was unconstitutional where it interfered with the right of parents to
229. See, e.g., People v. Jennings, 641 P.2d 276, 280 (Colo. 1982) (finding that standards
governing the parent-child relationship must be flexible while also protecting the child against
abuse).
230. 706 P.2d 263 (Wyo. 1985).
231. See id. at 264-65.
232. See id. at 266.
233. See id. at 268.
234. See id. at 266-68.
235. See id. at 268.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 268-70.
238. 386 N.W.2d 657 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
239. See id. at 660 (discussing the Michigan statute).
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use reasonable and timely corporal punishment.240 Hence, a facial re-
view was conducted, and the analysis focused on whether the phrase
"habitually causes or permits the health of a child to be injured" was
vague to the extent that it had a chilling effect on the parent's right to
discipline.24' In concluding that the phrase was not overbroad and, as
such, did not impede constitutionally protected conduct, the court de-
termined that the statute provided fair notice to parents and those
required to enforce the law.242 Crucial, however, to the court's con-
clusion was the determination that inclusion of the word "habitually"
effectively distinguished lawful discipline from that which was not.
If the phrase in question merely proscribed causing or permitting
injury to the health of the child, we would agree with defendant
Mary Hicks that normal discipline might be "chilled" through
fear that such conduct was covered by the statute. However, the
wording of the phrase in question provides that only habitually
causing or permitting the child's health to be injured is pro-
scribed. The word "habitually" protects the welfare of the child
without prohibiting reasonable and timely discipline by the
parent.243
Comparing the holdings in Keser and Hicks, it is apparent that
neither court believed that the due process requirements of notice
were vitiated by the statute in question. Hicks, however, implies that
the statutory language at issue in Keser could be subject to an over-
breadth challenge. Stated otherwise, the implication in Hicks is that a
statute that does no more than preclude the infliction of physical in-
jury fails to provide adequate notice to parents. Whereas, the notice
deficiency would be corrected if the statutory language, with greater
specificity, signified the difference between abuse and reasonable
discipline.
A final case of interest is State v. Suchomski.244 In Suchomski,
the defendant challenged a domestic abuse statute that precluded the
causing of physical harm to a child.245 The trial court dismissed the
indictment on defendant's motion that alleged the statute prevented
him from disciplining his child. 246 The state appealed the dismissal,
but the dismissal was upheld on appeal.247 The appellate court af-
firmed primarily because of its expansive interpretation of the defini-
tion of "physical harm" under Ohio law. As defined by the appellate
court, physical harm not only included trauma but also pain.248 As
240. See id. at 661.
241. Id. at 661-63.
242. See id. at 662.
243. Id.
244. 567 N.E.2d 1304 (Ohio 1991).
245. See id. at 1304-05.
246. See id. at 1305 (discussing the Ohio laws).
247. See id. at 1304.
248. See id. at 1305.
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such, the court maintained that the statute improperly impeded the
rights of parents to discipline their children.249
When the state appealed once again, the Supreme Court of Ohio
reversed the decision of the appellate court and reinstated the indict-
ment. ° The Ohio Supreme Court's decision did not appear to take
issue with the intermediate court's definition of the term "physical
harm." It indicated, however, that when parental discipline is at issue,
the definition of physical harm is qualified by the parental privilege.25'
It did so by indicating the statute defined the term "physical harm" to
mean "any injury. ' 252 The court then defined the term "injury" to
mean "the invasion of any legally protected interest. '253 The court
concluded, "[a] child does not have any legally protected interest
which is invaded by proper and reasonable parental discipline. 254
Keser, Hicks, and Suchomski point toward the difficulty of deter-
mining the scope of a parent's right to use disciplinary force when the
extent of that authority is defined as the "reasonable and moderate
use of force. ' '255 In Keser the court indicated that the jury was free to
conclude that the infliction of physical injury is not included within the
parameters of reasonable and moderate punishment. 256 Hicks and
Suchomski appear to indicate that lawful punishment does encompass
the right to cause physical injury.
A case that seems to combine the problems presented by the
"cruel or unjustifiable punishment" appeals, typified by the Bowers257
decision, and the "degree of harm" appeals exemplified by Keser,
Hicks, and Suchomski, is State v. Meinert.258 Meinert involved a baby-
sitter who spanked a three-year-old child for urinating on the floor.2 59
Four hours after the spanking, red marks were still visible on the
child's buttocks.26 ° The defendant was charged with a statute that
made it an offense to cause a child to suffer "unjustifiable physical





253. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 785 (6th ed. 1990))
254. Id.
255. See, e.g., Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263, 269-70 (Wyo. 1985); State v. Hicks, 624 N.E.2d
332, 334 (Ohio, 1993); Suchomski, 567 N.E.2d at 1305.
256. See Keser, 706 P.2d at 270-71.
257. Bowers v. State, 389 A.2d 341 (Md. 1978).
258. 594 P.2d 232 (Kan. 1979).
259. See id. at 232. The court did not specifically address whether the scope of the parental
privilege extends to baby-sitters in Kansas. The decision of the court would indicate that it does.
260. See id. at 232-33.
261. See id.
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words "unjustifiable physical pain" were vague.26 2 The decision of the
trial court was upheld by the Supreme Court of Kansas.2 63
Like Bowers, Meinert emphasized the two prongs of fair notice:
fairly apprising the defendant of the prohibited conduct and providing
guidelines to those who must enforce the law. Additionally, it used
the same analysis to determine if these requirements had been met. 64
However, Meinert then posed logical questions that other courts touch
upon only tangentially, if at all:
Where is the line to be drawn in determining if discipline or other
treatment of a child is justified or unjustified? How does one de-
cide whether or not a spanking is due a child and, if so, should it
be administered with the hands, a fly swatter, or a belt? Is one
slap, two slaps, or five slaps too many? Are two hard slaps a
violation of the statute but five very light slaps not? Do red
marks lasting only one hour relieve one from prosecution? Some
persons do not believe in any form of corporal punishment and to
them any such treatment would be unjustified. On the other
hand others may believe any correction, however severe, which
produces temporary pain only, and no lasting injury or disfigure-
ment, is justified. The statute could conceivably cover anything
from a minor spanking or slapping to severe beating depending
upon the personal beliefs of the individual.265
Meinert recognized that the parameters of the defense are com-
mingled with the interpretation of underlying statutes utilized to pros-
ecute parents who abuse their children. Moreover, the questions
posed by the court are relevant whenever the scope of the privilege is
delineated as being "reasonable and moderate" and the language of
the statute prohibits punishment that is cruel, unjustifiable, or
unlawful.
As indicated by the discussion above, appeals based on claims of
vagueness are routinely rejected by the courts. Moreover, the deci-
sions are difficult to compare because of differences in the statutory
language of either the underlying offense, the defense, or both. How-
ever, these decisions do point toward several problems posed by the
"reasonable and moderate" use of force defense.
First, there is no uniformity among the decisions indicating
whether the scope of the defense includes the right to inflict physical
injury.266 Second, although one of the requirements of due process is
262. See id. at 233. Meinert revolves around a statute that incorporates the privilege to use
force into the elements of the offense. See id. Stated otherwise, the interpretation of a general
justification statute was not at issue. Rather, the statute incorporated the privilege by precluding
the infliction of "unjustifiable physical pain." See id.
263. See id. at 235.
264. See id. at 234-35.
265. Id. at 234.
266. Compare People v. Hicks, 386 N.w.2d 657 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986), and State v. Suchom-
ski, 567 N.E.2d 1304 (Ohio 1991), with Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263 (Wyo. 1985).
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that the statute must provide adequate guidelines for enforcement, it
is interesting to note that with some frequency appeals in these cases
result because the lower court has determined that the statute was
vague.267 Thus, the language of the statute was determined not to be
capable of common understanding by the trial courts who must en-
force it. Third, the courts are not in agreement as to whether the use
of corporal punishment is a fundamental right. If the courts do not
view the right of parents to use corporal punishment as a fundamental
right, the issue of vagueness is assessed only with regard to the partic-
ular defendant before the court and whether that defendant should
have known that his conduct was prohibited. When the conduct eval-
uated is severe, the vagueness doctrine is not rigorously tested.268
Bowers and others following its approach seem to indicate that
"cruel mistreatment" and other such phrases can withstand the stricter
scrutiny of a facial review. But these decisions, commonly relying on
dicta, assume that the long-standing recognition of reasonable and
moderate punishment supplies the clarity required for due process.
This is a reasoned posture when severe discipline has been imposed
and the statute precludes cruel treatment.
It can be argued, however, that the closer both of these factors
move toward the middle ground, the less notice is provided. Stated
otherwise, the closer the statutory language comes to precluding nor-
mative discipline (for example, the "infliction of pain"), or the more
nebulous it becomes in terms of defining the crime (for example, "un-
necessarily severe or unlawful corporal punishment"), the greater is
the risk that normal parental discipline will be chilled. Meinert is an
apt representation of this phenomenon because the statute at issue in
267. See People v. Jennings, 641 P.2d 276, 276 (Colo. 1982) (reversing district court finding
that the phrase "cruelly punish[ I" was unconstitutionally vague); State v. Sinica, 372 N.W.2d
445, 449 (Neb. 1985) (reversing district court motion to quash information on basis that phrase
"cruelly punish" was unconstitutionally vague); Suchomski, 567 N.E.2d at 1305 (reversing dis-
trict court and appellate court determination that statute prohibiting infliction of "physical
harm" to family member was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad); cf State v. Lucero, 531
P.2d 1215, 1216 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975) (overturning district court indictment dismissal on basis
that abuse statute that precluded negligently "causing ... child to be tortured,... or cruelly
punished" violated Equal Protection Clause of Constitution). The major emphasis of the court's
discussion was that the statute did not inappropriately distinguish between those who batter
children and those who batter adults. However, the dissenting opinion of Judge Sutin indicates
that the statute is vague and indefinite. See Lucero, 531 P.2d at 1218.
268. It should not be inferred from this statement that the author would support the classifi-
cation of a parent's right to use corporal punishment as fundamental. Indeed, Professor Mary
Kate Kearney, in her article Substantive Due Process and Parental Corporal Punishment: De-
mocracy and the Excluded Child, 32 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1 (1995), presents a compelling argu-
ment that the defense is not entitled to such a status. Rather, the point to be made is that in the
context of this defense, a vagueness analysis based upon a nonfacial review seldom requires
careful analysis because the injuries to the child are typically severe. See, e.g., Hunter v. State,
360 N.E.2d 588, 594-95 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) ("Men of ordinary intelligence and experience are
capable of judging if hitting a child with a frying pan is 'unnecessarily severe corporal punish-
ment."'). In the face of this reality, the issues of notice and chilling are subject to less judicial
scrutiny.
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the case precluded unjustifiable pain, and the injuries to the child
were red marks from a spanking. 69
Finally, it should be noted that appellate courts commonly treat
the issue of how much punishment is excessive in a piecemeal fashion.
That is to say, the defendant claims that the words "cruel punishment"
are vague, or that the prohibition against causing "physical harm" in-
vades the right to use lawful punishment, or that the privilege itself is
ambiguous. In a sense the problem is not that the independent pieces
of the statutory framework are vague, but rather that the entire statu-
tory scheme suffers from imprecision.
Viewed from a practical context, when each of the components is
defined in an obscure manner, the risk that protected conduct will be
chilled or that the defendant and law enforcement are without ade-
quate guidance is compelling even if the courts typically find that each
of the statutory components pass constitutional muster. Although the
need for flexibility within the criminal justice system is important, per-
vasive ambiguity raises issues of fundamental fairness. In the context
of protecting children from abuse, it is especially important for the
underlying offense to be broadly drawn. But in response to that need,
it becomes equally important for the defense to be articulated in a
straightforward manner.
From the perspective of parents raising children, it must be asked
if a legal restriction against cruel or unlawful punishment that is rea-
sonable, and moderate, and may or may not include the right to inflict
physical injury, really provides fair notice. The courts, recognizing the
difficulties posed,270 generally indicate that it does. Nevertheless, the
premise could be characterized as a legal fiction created to protect
innocent and vulnerable victims.
B. Sufficiency of Evidence Cases
The second ground frequently appearing as a basis for appeal in
cases involving the parental use of disciplinary force centers around
claims of insufficiency of the evidence. When a claim of insufficiency
of the evidence is asserted the defendant maintains that evidence in-
troduced at trial failed to establish, as a matter of law, that his conduct
269. See Meinert, 594 P.2d at 233.
270. See People v. Jennings, 641 P.2d 276, 278 (Colo. 1982) ("The vagueness standard, while
frequently enunciated, is nevertheless difficult to apply."); Keser, 706 P.2d at 271 ("The statutory
prohibition of child abuse encompasses a very difficult and nebulous area; it is not an easy task
to clearly distinguish child abuse from parental punishment."); cf. Moakley v. State, 547 So. 2d
1246, 1247 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (noting, in the context of sufficiency of evidence review,
"[tihe term excessive, as used by the Kama court, is rather vague and like other such terms is
often definable as 'in the eyes of the beholder"') (quoting Kama v. State, 507 So. 2d 154, 156
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)); Bowers v. State, 389 A.2d 341, 349 (Md. 1978) ("It is true that terms
such as 'cruel or inhumane' and 'cruel mistreatment' are by nature somewhat loose-fitting de-
scriptions of human behavior.").
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fell within the scope of the offense.2 71 Commonly, in the context of
parents using force against children, the defendant contends that the
force used was not unlawful because of its disciplinary nature.272 In
such cases the defendant does not dispute that force was used.2 73
Rather, the defendant asserts that the state failed to establish that the
force used was not protected by the corporal punishment defense.274
The appellate court then reviews the evidence introduced, in the light
most favorable to the state,275 and assesses whether the judgment of
the fact finder was clearly erroneous.276 These components of the
standard of review mean that an appellant is confronted with a signifi-
cant burden in seeking reversal.277
While appeals based on claims of vagueness appear primarily in
those jurisdictions defining the corporal punishment privilege as the
271. See, e.g., State v. Ivey, 648 N.E.2d 519, 523-24 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); State v. Bogan,
No. 11920, 1990 WL 80572, *1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. June 14, 1990) (unpublished opinion); State v.
Nitka. No. 94-2975-CR, 1995 WL 690527, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 1995) (unpublished
opinion).
272. See Nitka, 1995 WL 690527, at *1.
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. E.g., Deloso v. State, 376 A.2d 873, 880 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (finding that evi-
dence was insufficient to sustain conviction when viewed in light most favorable to state); State
v. Crowdell, 487 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Neb. 1992); State v. Leaf, 623 A.2d 1329, 1330 (N.H. 1993);
Commonwealth v. Moore, 395 A.2d 1328 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
276. See Carson v. United States, 556 A.2d 1076, (D.C. 1989); State v. Crowdell, 487 N.W.2d
273, 277 (Neb. 1992); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rochon, 581 A.2d 239, 244 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1990) ("A claim that the evidence presented at trial was contradictory and unable to support the
verdict requires the grant of a new trial only when the verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to
shock one's sense of justice." (citations omitted)).
277. For example, in Carson v. United States, 556 A.2d 1076 (D.C. 1989), the court reviewed
the conviction of a mother who was charged with three counts of cruelty to children. The case
arose following the beating of the children with an electrical cord because they lied to the de-
fendant concerning some missing money. See id. at 1077. The evidence in this case established
that six-year-old Everett had loop-shaped marks on his body extending from the back of his
neck, and down his right arm and leg. See id. at 1081. Seven marks were clustered around his
elbow, and a dozen bruises and lacerations were observed on his thigh. See id. Four unhealed
sores were observable in the admitted photographs. See id. Marks on his five-year-old and
eight-year-old sisters were similar but not as severe. See id. The mother appealed the decision
based on a sufficiency of evidence claim, and the court reviewed the conviction based upon a
corporal punishment standard excluding discipline that was either inflicted without parental pur-
pose or that was inflicted with a conscious disregard that serious harm would result. See id. at
1077, 1079.
The majority opinion first indicated that it believed the evidence supported the conclusion
that appellant acted out of a "legitimate desire to correct the children." Id. at 1080. Addition-
ally, in a footnote it stated, "[wie echo the trial court's sentiment that appellant had a genuine
and deep-felt love and concern for the children." Id. at 1080 n.3. Second, it concluded that the
punishment was not so excessive as to necessitate the conclusion that the appellant acted with a
conscious disregard that serious harm would result. See id. at 1080. Despite these conclusions,
the court indicated that it would not reverse the conviction because it was not "plainly in error"
and stated that "[w]e are loath to substitute our judgment for that of the trier-of-fact." Id. at
1080-81. Interestingly, a concurring opinion supports the conclusion of the court, but because of
the nature of the injuries inflicted, takes issue with the majority's equivocation on the issue of
whether the appellant acted with conscious disregard that her actions could result in serious
injury. See id. at 1081.
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reasonable and moderate use of force,2 78 appeals based on insuffi-
ciency of the evidence are asserted under each approach to the de-
fense. Under the Model Penal Code approach, 79 the reasonable/
moderate approach, 280 and variations of the reasonable/moderate ap-
278. See supra notes 191-95 and accompanying text.
279. Under the Model Penal Code approach, because serious physical injury is specifically
precluded, claims of insufficiency of the evidence cannot prevail in the face of obvious abuse.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moore, 395 A.2d 1328 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978). In Moore, a stepfather
beat his seven-year-old stepson with a paddle-stick on his back, buttocks, and thigh because he
allowed friends to enter the home. See id. at 1330. The injuries sustained by the boy resulted in
hospitalization for six months. See id. The court found the evidence sufficient to sustain the
defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, but reversed the conviction for possession of an
instrument of crime, finding that the paddle-stick used by the defendant was not an "instrument
of crime" as required by the statute. See id. at 1332-33; see also State v. Beins, 456 N.W.2d 759,
762 (Neb. 1990) (involving a father who struck his daughter in the face, knocked her to the
ground, and began choking her until she thought her "eyes were just going to pop out of [her]
head") The "discipline" in Beins resulted from an argument concerning the purchase of a car.
See id. at 761; see also Commonwealth v. Rochon, 581 A.2d 239 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). The
defendant/mother in Rochon became angry at her seventeen-month-old child for soiling his dia-
per. See id. at 244. To "discipline" her child the defendant struck him with her shoe, and stated,
"I'm going to cool this m--r f--r off' and then immersed the boy in water until he became
cyanotic while stating to him "swim, bitch, swim." See id.; see also United States v. Ziots, 36 M.J.
1007, 1008 (A.C.M.R. 1993) (involving a defendant who disciplined his three-year-old stepson
for lying by striking him between the eyes and on the back with a closed fist).
280. In jurisdictions defining the defense as the reasonable and moderate use of disciplinary
force, the degree of harm that can be inflicted is not specified. Thus, in contrast to jurisdictions
that specifically state that serious injury is not encompassed by the defense, the fact finder in
states that rely on this standard has leeway to find that something less than serious injury was
unreasonable. The subjectivity of this standard has implications at both the trial and appellate
stages. At the trial level the subjectivity translates into a commission to evaluate reasonableness
at both ends of the punishment continuum. That is to say, the fact finder has the discretion to
determine that punishment without a physical consequence is unreasonable or that punishment
with a significant physical impact is reasonable. Thus, under this approach the punishment need
not rise to the level of serious injury to preclude application of the defense, but conversely, such
punishment is not automatically excluded either. Because only the defendant is allowed to ap-
peal on the basis of insufficiency of evidence, the reported cases deal with the situation where
the defense has not been successfully asserted. Thus, whether this standard tolerates higher
levels of violence at the trial stage than the Model Penal Code approach cannot be determined.
It is reasonable to assume that it does not, due to the fact that the concepts of reasonable punish-
ment and serious injury are incongruous. However, once the determination has been made by
the fact finder that the punishment was not lawful, rarely will an appellate court hand down a
reversal. This results because the appellate court is evaluating a subjective determination of
reasonableness, because the sufficiency of evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the
state, and because reversal is necessitated only if the decision of the fact finder was clearly erro-
neous. With these factors in mind, the reported cases from jurisdictions using a standard that
requires the punishment to be reasonable routinely reject appeals when serious injury has been
inflicted. See State v. Barnett, 521 So. 2d 663 (La. Ct. App. 1988). In Barnett, the defendant/
father beat his six-year-old son with a belt for lying and covered the boy's body with bruises. See
id. at 665. The court, with little discussion, determined that the evidence was sufficient to estab-
lish that the punishment went beyond the realm of reasonableness. See id. at 666; see also State
v. Coombs, 381 A.2d 288, 288-89 (Me. 1978) (finding that evidence introduced in aggravated
battery of 21-month-old child was sufficient to defeat assertion that the defendant's ccnduct was
privileged without recitation of the underlying facts); State v. Nitka, 542 N.W.2d 238 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1995) (unpublished opinion) (involving a father's beating with a belt leaving extensive
bruising on five-year-old child's thigh and buttocks that was sufficient to overcome defendant's
claim that the discipline was reasonable).
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proach, 281 convictions are not reversed if the child suffered life-threat-
ening or permanent injury. At the opposite end of the spectrum,
reported decisions dealing with sufficiency of evidence in a discipli-
nary context have not been found unless the imposed punishment also
resulted in a physical consequence. Again, this would appear to be at
least anecdotal evidence that successful prosecutions are not routine
under any approach for physical conduct that is merely offensive or
threatening or that has a physical consequence not resulting in injury.
Sufficiency of evidence cases would appear to indicate that chil-
dren are protected from serious physical injury, and parents are pro-
tected from prosecution for inconsequential acts of force under each
approach. This category of cases, however, also points toward the
conclusion that children living in states that utilize a standard that pro-
tects parental aggression unless it results in, or creates a substantial
risk of, serious physical injury are not being protected from what
many would consider to be abuse. A comparison of the approaches
that utilize this type of parameter explains this premise.
In Moakley v. State282 the court reviewed a conviction of a father
for striking an eight-year-old child with a belt.283 As a result of the
beating, the child had bruise marks on her buttocks and hip.284 The
court reviewed the defendants claim of insufficiency of the evidence
with respect to a statute that prohibited the "malicious punishment"
of a child.285 The court in reviewing the verdict against the defendant
held that the use of force was not privileged if it was "motivated by
malice. '2 6 Malice was defined as the use of force that was not moti-
vated by a parental purpose or which resulted in "great bodily harm,
permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement. '287
In refusing to uphold the defendant's conviction, the court indi-
cated that although the defendant had perhaps struck the child too
281. See State v. Crouser, 911 P.2d 725, 731 (Haw. 1996) (interpreting a statute that requires
that the employed force be used with regard for the age and size of minor, that it be reasonably
related to promoting the welfare of the child, and that it not cause or create a substantial risk of
serious injury); State v. Waller, 538 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (interpreting a standard
that required utilized force to be reasonable and reasonably necessary, and finding evidence
sufficient to sustain mother's conviction in the face of her assertion that beating of her six-year-
old son by striking him in the face and then with a belt on his buttocks and legs was reasonable
discipline. Based upon this standard, the court found that the defendant's conduct (repeated
beatings on torso, arms, buttocks, and thighs with plastic bat) in beating 14-year-old daughter of
his live-in girlfriend was not protected).
282. 547 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
283. See id. at 1246-47. The facts in the case indicated that the defendant had called a state
agency asking that the child be removed from the home because she was "ungovernable." See
id. at 1246. Later, the same agency received a report from the child abuse registry concerning
the defendant. See id. at 1247. When the agency worker went to the defendant's home to inves-
tigate, the child was found standing next to a wall crying with wet pants. See id. It was at this
time that the worker discovered the injuries that formed the basis for the charge. See id.
284. See id.
285. See id. at 1246.
286. Id. at 1247.
287. Id.
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hard, he had not inflicted permanent disability or disfigurement. 88
Moreover, it indicated that "the law should be quite careful about in-
trusion into family relationships and must tread most lightly in border-
line cases." '89 Holding that this was such a borderline case, the jury's
verdict was reversed.29 °
Moakley represents the parameters of a strict malice approach.
As such, the issue before the court is whether the discipline either
lacked parental purpose or resulted in serious injury. When this stan-
dard is utilized, children are arguably at the greatest risk for abuse.
This results because any conduct undertaken for a disciplinary pur-
pose is protected unless the child is seriously injured. 91
In a fashion akin to the malice approach, the Model Penal Code
uses similar factors to address the type of injury that is not pro-
tected.92 The language of the Model Penal Code, however, repre-
sents a significant departure from the malice standard because the
potential for harm is specifically addressed. That is to say, under the
Model Penal Code approach, the fact finder is asked to evaluate the
conduct and its potential for harm, not merely the result.293 This is
accomplished by mandating that the fact finder assess whether the
force used was either known to cause or actually created a substantial
risk of serious injury.2 94 The practical effect of this standard is best
explained by illustration of three scenarios.
First, assume that serious injury is actually inflicted. If such in-
jury results, then the court will logically conclude that the conduct was
"known to cause" such injury because it in fact resulted. Second, as-
sume that no injury results to the child. In the absence of any injury,
the analysis should focus upon whether the conduct posed a substan-
tial risk of serious injury. The conclusion of the fact finder may be
that the conduct did or did not pose such a risk, but the question is
nevertheless at issue. Finally, consider the situation where physical
injury is inflicted, but it is not a serious injury. Again the issue should
be whether a substantial risk of serious injury was posed by the con-
duct. In making this analysis the fact finder may conclude that despite
the lack of serious injury, the conduct nevertheless posed such a risk.




291. Although Moakley employs a malice standard, utilization of this approach is rare. In
most jurisdictions the malice approach has either been specifically rejected, modified, or re-
placed by a more modern standard. See infra Appendix.
292. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(1)(b) (1985).
293. See id.
294. For ease of discussion, the phrase "serious injury" will be used as a substitute for the
actual Model Penal Code language that precludes placing the child at a substantial risk for
"death, serious bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme or unnecessary pain, mental distress, or
humiliation." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08.
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not create a risk beyond the actual consequence of the conduct.
Stated otherwise, the existence of some injury may affect the evalua-
tion of whether risk was posed for injury beyond that which was
endured.
This contingency seems to be at play in several opinions. For ex-
ample, in State v. Kaimimoku295 the Hawaiian court reviewed a con-
viction for abuse of a family member where the defendant had
asserted the parental corporal punishment defense. The incident giv-
ing rise to the charge arose as the result of a fight between the defend-
ant and his seventeen-year-old daughter. 96 The evidence established
that the daughter became angry at her father as a result of his conduct
toward his wife and her mother.297 When the daughter began shout-
ing obscenities at the father, he struck her with an open hand several
times in the face and then with a closed fist struck her in the shoul-
der. 98 As a result of the father's conduct, the daughter was bruised,
"black and blue" on her side, and had prints of the defendant's hands
and thumb on her neck and scratches on her face.2 99 In noting that
the Hawaiian corporal punishment defense was a verbatim enactment
of the Model Penal Code defense, the court indicated that the statute
"grants to parents considerable autonomy to discipline their children,
and as long as parents use moderate force for permissible purposes in
disciplining their children and do not create a substantial risk of the
excessive injuries specified.., they will not be criminally liable."3" In
reversing the defendant's conviction the court indicated that there was
no evidence that the defendant struck his daughter for any purpose
other than discipline.3 °1 Moreover, the court then referred to a previ-
ous decision 3°2 involving the assertion of the parental force defense
where the Hawaiian Supreme Court found no evidence of serious
bodily injury.3 °3 After discussing the facts in the prior decision, the
court inferred that the level of aggression in the case before it was less
severe, and thus it could not sustain the defendant's conviction as a
matter of law.3°
295. 841 P.2d 1076 (Haw. Ct. App. 1992).
296. See id. at 1077. The victim in this case was a 17-year-old child. The court notes without
discussion that the daughter was a minor at the time of the offense. See id. at 1080.
297. See id. at 1077.
298. See id.
299. See id. at 1078.
300. Id. at 1080.
301. See id.
302. See id. (citing State v. DeLeon, 813 P.2d 1382 (Haw. 1991)).
303. See DeLeon, 813 P.2d at 1384. The facts in DeLeon established that a 14-year-old child
had been struck with a 36-inch-long belt six to 10 times, the belt was one and a half inches wide,
was folded in half, and left bruises on the child that lasted for approximately one week. See id.
at 1383.
304. See Kaimimoku, 841 P.2d at 1080. But see State v. Crouser, 911 P.2d 725, 731 (Haw.
1996). Following the Kaimimoku and DeLeon decisions, the Hawaiian parental justification
statute was amended for the "express purpose of 'reduc[ing] the permitted level of force that a
person responsible for the care of a minor ... may use."' Id. at 733 (citing the legislative his-
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The point of interest from this decision is twofold. First, the court
does not explicitly address the issue of whether the conduct posed a
substantial risk of causing serious injury. It did not question whether
striking the victim in the torso with a closed fist or slapping her in the
face could have caused serious injury. Instead, the court appears to
take the posture that risk was not posed because the injury inflicted
was not serious. In finding that the injuries were not serious, the court
overturned the conviction of the defendant." 5 This decision clearly
indicates the Model Penal Code defense protects parents who injure
their children, so long as the injuries are not serious. 30 6 It also sug-
gests that although the Model Penal Code approach requires an evalu-
ation of whether the parental conduct posed a substantial risk of
serious harm, the court may fail to evaluate this issue when the child
suffers some injury that the court deems to be less than serious. 30 7
This phenomenon appears again in State v. Brunner, °8 where the
court reviewed a child abuse statute that, similar to the Model Penal
Code, set the outside limit of appropriate discipline at conduct that
creates a substantial risk of serious injury. Specifically, the Ohio child
abuse statute made it a crime to inflict serious harm to the child when
using excessive corporal punishment that created a substantial risk of
serious physical harm to the child.30 9 In Brunner, the mother of five-
year-old Michael Sallee was found guilty of this offense. 310 The issue
on appeal was whether the conviction should stand in light of the
mother's position that she struck the five-year-old boy as a discipli-
nary measure.31
The state's evidence established that as a result of inflicted pun-
ishment, the defendant's son had numerous bruises and contusions on
tory). The new justification defense requires that the court consider the age and size of the
victim, as well as the relationship between the force used and the purpose for imposing the
discipline. See id. at 730-31.
305. See Kaimimoku, 841 P.2d at 1080.
306. See United States v. Gowadia, 34 M.J. 714, 716-18 (A.C.M.R. 1992) (interpreting the
Model Penal Code defense, the court reversed the defendant's conviction on specification I,
arising from the beating of his 12-year-old stepson with a webbed belt, but affirmed the convic-
tion on specification II that arose as a result of tying the child's hands and legs and placing a
plastic bag over his head).
307. See United States v. Scofield, 33 M.J. 857, 863 (A.C.M.R. 1991). The court, interpreting
the Model Penal Code defense, set aside a plea of guilty to the charges of assault against a
person under 16 years old. See id. at 864. Evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing estab-
lished that the defendant used a belt to beat his six-year-old daughter and eight-year-old son.
See id. at 859. The pediatrician who testified concerning the daughter's bruising described it as
"fairly extensive" but indicated that the child was admitted to the hospital for evaluation rather
than treatment. See id. at 863. The court set aside the guilty plea, finding that it did not meet the
Model Penal Code standard of "excessive injury." See id. at 863-64.
308. No. CA84-08-100, 1985 WL 8658 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 15, 1985) (unpublished opinion).
309. Ohio does not have a general justification statute that sets out the corporal punishment
defense. The abuse statute at issue in Brunner prohibits "cruel punishment" that is excessive and
places the child at a substantial risk of serious injury. See id. at *2.
310. See id. at *1.
311. See id. at *5.
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the legs, back, and chest, as well as scratches on his arms.312 The ap-
pellant introduced evidence that her child was "difficult" and "un-
ruly," that she had administered "approximately fifteen swats to the
boy's rear with her belt," that her past efforts to discipline by other
means had failed, and that on the day the injuries were inflicted her
son had used vulgar language approximately five minutes after she
had instructed him not to do so. 3 13 Appellant further stated that she
had been threatened with eviction if her son used "foul" language in
front of other tenants of the building. 314
The court reversed the defendant's conviction finding that her
conduct did not fall within the purview of the statute.315 In doing so it
held that the mother had not struck the boy for other than disciplinary
reasons and that she had done so to "correct the boy's almost incorri-
gible behavior, which exhibited and manifested a direct and open op-
position to [the] mother's parental authority. ' 316  While not
specifically stating so, the clear inference was that the court found the
punishment imposed by the defendant/mother was not excessive
under the circumstances. Additionally, it found that the injuries sus-
tained did not rise to the level of serious physical harm.317 After elim-
inating each of the definitional categories of serious harm, the court
indicated that "[tihe bruises exhibited by the photos certainly are not
permanent in nature, and although temporary, were not of the nature
requiring any type of surgical repair or treatment. ' 318 In concluding
that the conviction was "against the manifest weight of the evidence,"
the court stated: "While appellant's conduct in the case at bar is cer-
tainly questionable, we are unwilling to hold that her efforts to disci-
pline her child in the manner she saw fit rises to the level of criminal
conduct required by the Revised Code., 319
Neither the Kaimimoku nor Brunner decisions discuss the sub-
stantial risk issue. This failure to evaluate one of the statutory criteria
might have been an oversight. Or perhaps, the courts neglected to
discuss the issue because they assumed that a substantial risk of seri-
ous injury was not posed by the parental conduct. Nevertheless, the
absence of any discussion, the language of the opinions, and the facts
of the cases suggest that the threshold of aggression tolerated by this
standard may influence or minimize the substantial risk issue when
the child suffers injury that is not regarded as serious. A variation on
this theme can be noted even if a court does discuss the substantial
risk issue.
312. See id. at *4.
313. Id.
314. See id.
315. See id. at *6.
316. Id. at *5.
317. See id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at *5-6.
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For example, in State v. Ivey 3 2 0 the defendant was charged with
abuse of his ten-year-old child. Similar concerns to those presented in
the Brunner case were at issue in that the court was reviewing a con-
viction that required a finding that the child had been "abused" with
resulting "serious physical harm," and the parameters of the parental
privilege to use force required a finding that the punishment was ex-
cessive and created a substantial risk of serious physical injury.32 l
Evidence introduced at trial established that the defendant pun-
ished his child for failing to inform the defendant that he had received
a detention at school.3 2 2 The punishment included hitting the child in
the chest and eye and whipping his buttocks and legs with a belt.323
The day after the injuries had been inflicted, they were detected by
school personnel, and the boy was then transported to the hospital.324
The doctor who examined the boy indicated that there were "bruises
and swelling on his buttocks and legs," that the sides of his arms were
swollen and bruised, that open cuts appeared on the buttocks area,
and that the injury to the boy's blackened eye was consistent with
being punched by a fist.3 2 5 He was released from the hospital without
receiving medication or dressings.326
The court reversed the defendant's conviction.327 In contrast to
Brunner, the court in Ivey indicated that the punishment administered
in this instance was excessive.328 However, the court indicated that, in
addition to being excessive, the punishment must also pose a substan-
tial risk of serious harm.329 The court did not find that the defendant's
conduct either resulted in or created a substantial risk of serious phys-
ical harm. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that there was
no evidence that the boy "was in great pain" or that the doctor had
found it "necessary to hospitalize the boy, order any type of pain
killer, (even aspirin), or to schedule another medical exam. '33 ° The
court concluded its discussion by acknowledging the father's defense,
320. 648 N.E.2d 519 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
321. See id. at 523.
322. See id. at 521.
323. See id.
324. See id.
325. Id. at 521-22.
326. See id. at 522. The doctor also noted old bruises on the boy's buttocks. The victim
indicated these bruises were the result of previous beatings. See id. at 521.
327. See id. at 526.
328. See id. at 524.
329. See id. at 523. It is interesting to note that this statute requires that the punishment
must create a substantial risk of serious physical harm and it must be excessive. See id. (discuss-
ing the state's burden of proof). In order for the parental discipline to be unlawful the conduct
must meet both criteria: excessiveness and serious injury. See id. If it fails to meet either prong
then the discipline is lawful. This approach is distinguishable from jurisdictions where excessive-
ness and the potential for serious injury are both at issue but are posed in a disjunctive fashion.
See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 106 (West 1983); Wis. STAT. § 939.45 (1996). In disjunctive
jurisdictions if the punishment is either excessive or creates a risk of serious injury the defense
fails. See Ivey, 648 N.E.2d at 523.
330. Ivey, 648 N.E.2d at 524.
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noting that "the injuries sustained ... were the result of the imposition
of corporal punishment by a father who judged his son's school con-
duct and acts of deception warranted a strong physical disciplinary
response. "331
Thus, although the Ivey decision gives lip service to the substan-
tial risk issue, the decision of the court that no such risk was created
appears to be based on the ultimate outcome of the discipline and the
lack of what the courts categorize as serious injury. The issue of po-
tential for harm, whether the boy was at risk for serious injury because
of extensive beatings and being punched in the eye, is mitigated be-
cause the outcome of the conduct is not serious, a criterion this court
implies is one that would require hospitalization.
These cases indicate that, whether the court is utilizing the Model
Penal Code approach, or a variation thereof, when one of the criteria
used for applying the defense is that the force must result in or create
a risk of serious physical injury, children will be at risk for what many
would call abuse. This occurs for two reasons. First, this approach
clearly protects conduct that results in physical injury, unless the sub-
stantial risk issue comes into play. Thus, the infliction of injury for the
purpose of discipline, that is not permanent or debilitating, is gener-
ally protected. Second, when some physical injury is inflicted, certain
courts seem to focus on the outcome of the discipline rather than the
potential for harm.332 Stated otherwise, if serious injury did not result,
the child was not at risk-end of discussion.
331. Id. The dissenting opinion took issue with the majority's opinion that the defendant
had not exceeded the bounds of permissible punishment. See id. at 526. The dissenting judge
noted that the evidence established dark purple bruises, open sores, linear welt marks up and
down the boy's arms and legs, and his black eye, and the judge additionally referenced testimony
of a social worker indicating that she had taken the child to the hospital because the bruising was
so extensive that she felt the child was at risk if he remained in the home. See id. at 526-27.
Based upon this evidence the dissenting opinion indicated that the verdict was supported by the
evidence. See id. at 528.
332. See, e.g., State v. Kaimimoku, 841 P.2d 1076, 1080 (Haw. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing
father's conviction and focusing on the child's injuries); Ivey, 648 N.E.2d at 521-22 (focusing on
harm child suffered and reversing conviction). This of course, is not always the case. Some
courts do analyze and discuss the substantial risk issue. For example, in Commonwealth v. Ogin,
540 A.2d 549, 550 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), a mother and father appealed a conviction for simple
assault and endangering the welfare of the child. The facts in the case revolved around three
separate incidents.
With respect to the first incident, a witness testified that the victim's mother was dragging
her by the feet, that the child stumbled, and that the mother then "flung her like an old rag doll
against the building." Id. at 551. The witness further indicated that the entire backside of the
child hit the wall and that she then fell forward and hit her head on the concrete steps. See id.
This punishment occurred because the child had not remained in front of her home as directed.
See id. The second incident occurred when the child was taken to see Santa Claus. A neighbor
held the child, April, during a long wait, and when she put the child down, she went to her
mother and stretched out her arms to be picked up. See id. The mother slapped April with the
back of her hand. See id. Ten minutes later, the child once again held out her arms to be picked
up, and the mother hit April with the back of her hand, knocking her into a brick wall. See id.
The third incident occurred when the father placed a plate of hot spaghetti in front of April at
the dinner table. See id. When the child did not eat the food, the father pushed the hot food
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C. Assessing the Status Quo
Both the vagueness and sufficiency of evidence cases indicate that
articulating a standard for the middle ground is difficult. Some would
argue that it is a necessary evil required to protect intrusion into pa-
rental authority. Moreover, under each approach an attempt is made
to delineate the line between abuse and reasonable discipline by tem-
pering the amount of force that may be used. A review of current
approaches demonstrates how most jurisdictions either fail to draw a
clear line between permissible and impermissible acts of force or draw
the line at a level that threatens the well-being of children.
In the majority of states, excessive punishment is assessed by de-
termining whether the punishment imposed was reasonable.333 Be-
cause this term is undefined, the conduct in question need not rise to
the level of inflicting or creating the risk of serious injury. This stan-
dard has positive implications in that it is flexible enough to capture
parental conduct that results in physical injury to the child, what many
would call abuse. The standard, however, is not without shortcom-
ings. With "reasonableness" as their only guide, parents have little
guidance as to the limits of a lawful physical interaction with their
children, and fact finders are left to define the privilege on a case-by-
case basis. It is reasonable to speculate that many jurors would find
that a single swat to the bottom of a clothed child with an open hand
was reasonable and that a beating with a belt that required hospitali-
zation was not. It is just as likely, however, that what may or may not
be reasonable might be based on the childhood perspectives of the
fact finder, rather than the mandates of the law.334 In a minority of
into the child's face. See id. Her face was burned and swelled. See id. As a result of these
incidents, April did not suffer any permanent injury. See id.
On appeal, one of the issues presented by the defendants was that the evidence introduced
at trial was insufficient to overcome their contention that the force used was justifiable corporal
punishment. See id. at 552. In applying the Pennsylvania justification defense, which mirrors the
Model Penal Code defense, the court indicated that the defense involves two components-first
that the parents were attempting to discipline the child, and second that the force employed
created "a substantial risk of ... extreme pain or mental distress." Id. at 555. The court as-
sumed arguendo that the parents met the parental purpose requirement. In assessing the second
component, the court concluded that the parents were not entitled to rely on the defense be-
cause their conduct created a "substantial risk ... of extreme pain or mental distress" and as
such was not privileged. Id.
333. See infra Appendix; see also Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 44 S.E.2d 419, 423-24 (Va.
1947); Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263, 269, 270 (Wyo. 1985).
334. It is impossible in cases of this nature to speculate as to what extent the personal child-
hood perspectives of the fact finder prevail over the dictates of law. But see Stoker v. Common-
wealth, 828 S.w.2d 619 (Ky. 1992). In this case the judicial musings in the consolidated appeal of
a mother and her live-in boyfriend would suggest that fact finders are at times "reacting to
nothing more than their own subjective ideas of child discipline," a concern expressed in the
Bowers decision. Bowers v. State, 389 A.2d 341, 349 (M.D. 1978). In Stoker, the mother was
convicted of first-degree sodomy, first-degree criminal abuse, and first-degree sexual abuse.
Stoker, 828 S.w.2d at 621. The live-in boyfriend was convicted of first-degree rape, first-degree
sodomy, first-degree sexual abuse, first-degree criminal abuse, and terroristic threatening. See
id. The evidence established an incredible and grotesque assortment of sexual and abusive acts
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jurisdictions, this problem is avoided because statutory language spe-
cifically sets out conduct that is unlawful.335 In these jurisdictions the
fact finder again must determine what is excessive, but the parameters
of the defense are commonly defined as conduct that results in or cre-
ates a substantial risk of serious injury.3 36 In light of the significant
problem of child abuse and modern assessments of the impact of cor-
poral punishment, setting the outer limit at this threshold seems at
odds with modern societal values. In jurisdictions using this standard,
the limits of permissible violence are clearly drawn at a level that in-
cludes infliction of physical injury. Additionally, in terms of providing
guidance to parents, the statutory framework creates a clear inference
that a high level of force is permissible, so long as it is utilized for a
disciplinary purpose.337
Whether excessive punishment is undefined or specifically articu-
lated, the issue of necessity may also be at issue. When necessity is
evaluated, the circumstances surrounding imposition of the punish-
toward the mother's three daughters, age seven, six, and two, as well as a neighborhood girl who
was also seven. See id. at 622. In evaluating whether the crime of criminal abuse was unconstitu-
tionally vague, the court had no trouble deciding that the bizarre and freakish sexual acts of the
defendants met the statutory prohibition against "torture, cruel confinement or cruel punish-
ment." Id. at 624. The court then turned to the parental conduct of beating the children with a
wire coat hanger:
The question whether "hitting [a child] with a wire coat hanger" is sufficient to prove Crimi-
nal Abuse I is more difficult, particularly where, as here, the blows inflicted did not result in
medical treatment or leave scars or marks to verify that a severe beating had occurred. It
may well be there are situations where using a wire coat hanger to correct a child's behavior,
if not appropriate, is a least within the legal limits of parental discretion in raising their
children.
Id. at 625. The court nevertheless found that the nature and circumstances surrounding the
beatings was sufficient to support a finding that they were not normal parental discipline. See id.
at 625. Most interestingly, in a footnote explaining the court's position concerning punishment
inflicted by a wire coat hanger, the court noted:
For an interesting commentary on using a wire coat hanger to administer parental discipline,
see Time Magazine, Ted Turner, "Man of the Year," January 6, 1992, p.36: "to understand
why Turner and the father he worshipped had no ordinary filial competition, consider this:
When young Turner did something bad, his father Ed beat him with a wire coat hanger.
When young Turner did something very bad, Ed once ordered his son to beat him. 'He laid
down on the bed and gave me the razor strap and he said, 'Hit me harder,' 'Turner told
interviewer David Frost. 'And that hurt me more than getting the beating myself."'
Id. at 625 n.2.
335. See infra Appendix.
336. See infra Appendix.
337. Although the Model Penal Code approach does appear to tolerate significant parental
aggression, this approach may be a response, in part, to the manner in which the Model Penal
Code defines the term "physical injury" rather than a callousness with regard to the welfare of
children. As will be recalled, section 210.0(2) of the Model Penal Code, for purposes of the
crime of assault, defines the term "physical injury" to include the infliction of pain. Therefore, it
could be speculated that the parental defense, as set forth in the Model Penal Code, sets the
outer limit for parental discipline at the infliction of serious injury because the threshold for
conduct required to commit an assault is so low. The author has not compared the definitions of
the physical injury for the crimes of assault, child abuse, and domestic abuse to the parental
privilege as it exists in each state. However, whatever the legislative motivation of the states
utilizing this approach, it is clear that the ultimate impact is an approach that "proscribes only
the most severe abuses of authority." ROBINSON, supra note 31, § 144(e)(2), at 170.
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ment must be evaluated by the finder of fact. Arguably the addition
of necessity as a factor of consideration serves the purpose of provid-
ing an additional means of tempering the concept of reasonable pun-
ishment. Thus, when necessity is added to the computation, the issue
goes beyond the manner and effect of the punishment to include the
issue of why the punishment was administered. Although the use of
necessity to temper the use of disciplinary force can be viewed as an
important tool in assessing appropriate parental force, it also poses
conceptual difficulties. Indeed, it can be argued that using necessity to
temper the force is both difficult and analytically circuitous. It is diffi-
cult because the question of when to use physical punishment and the
extent to which it should be imposed is an extremely subjective issue.
Swearing by a five-year-old child may be a moral violation to some
parents and a childhood folly to others.
It is circuitous because in the course of using necessity to temper
the amount of force, an inference is created that justifies increased
aggression. Necessity essentially addresses the question of why the
child is being punished. To determine if the punishment was neces-
sary, the conduct of the child must be evaluated. If the punishment
must fit the misconduct, then the clear inference is that the greater the
childhood indiscretion, the greater the level of parental aggression
that should be tolerated. Thus, an underlying assumption that accom-
panies an evaluation of necessity is that the punishment imposed
should escalate in proportion to the misconduct. Although propor-
tionality of the punishment to the conduct has appeal with respect to
nonaggressive parenting techniques, it is a less palatable means of
evaluating conduct that results in injury.
As implied by the Model Penal Code, which does not evaluate
necessity, attempts to review the necessity of punishing a child re-
quires an objective review of what many Americans believe to be a
truly subjective decision. Evaluating necessity requires the fact finder
to enter the realm of family and parental privacy. Thus, the net im-
pact of necessity as a factor to temper force is the creation of an un-
derlying premise that supports an escalation of physical force, while
simultaneously being the most invasive criterion in terms of family
autonomy.
Conversely, the failure to address the issue of necessity is not
without repercussion. In the absence of a necessity evaluation, the
risk that the child will be subjected to capricious violence is enhanced.
If there is no requirement that the punishment be necessary, then the
fact finder is left to review only the purpose of the punishment and the
amount of force. Thus, if the parent asserts that the force was used to
discipline, the remaining issue in controversy is the amount of force
used. This is a serious flaw when the outside parameter of physical
force is anything short of conduct designed to result in death, serious
injury, or extreme pain.
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The problems associated with evaluating necessity, as well as
those associated with vagueness (exemplified by the majority reason-
able/moderate approach) and the minority Model Penal Code (serious
injury) approach, could be ameliorated if a bright line was drawn for
acceptable physical interaction between children and parents. The fo-
cus of this standard should be a restriction against the use of force that
results in physical injury to the child.
V. THE PROPOSED STATUTE
A. Goals to Be Accomplished
The discussion above points to several obvious factors that any
statutory enactment addressing a parent's right to use disciplinary
force should incorporate. One preliminary observation, however, is in
order. It is important to recall that criminal laws are a societal re-
sponse to conduct that goes beyond the pale of socially acceptable
behavior. They are not designed to respond to errors in judgment but
are instead adopted to react to that which invades the stability of the
culture. Thus, while the parental defense must be flexible enough to
address a wide range of parental conduct, it must also refrain from the
punishment of poor parenting techniques.
With this thought in mind, the first goal driving the parameters of
the privilege is that the defense must strike a socially acceptable and
legally defensible balance. An equilibrium between the interest of the
state in protecting the well-being of the child and the parental right to
direct the upbringing of their offspring must be struck. Second, to
avoid the problems associated with vagueness, the law should be
drafted in a manner that clearly delineates the scope of permissible
discipline. Next, in order to address parental discipline that is abusive,
but that does not result in physical repercussions to the child, the de-
fense should be drafted to address conduct that has both a physical
and a nonphysical consequence.338
338. This is an important feature for two reasons. First, certain crimes prohibit the use of
force that does not and/or was never intended to have a physical consequence. For example, the
crime of child abuse often makes it an offense to unnecessarily degrade a child. Parental conduct
that is unnecessarily degrading may or may not have a physical consequence. In illustration,
assume that, as a punishment for misbehavior, a father shaves his daughter's head in an erratic
fashion, with the ensuing result that she is provided with a wig by school personnel to prevent
her from being taunted by other children. See Commonwealth v. Krammer, 371 A.2d 1008, 1009
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1977). The parental conduct does not result in a physically harmful consequence
to the child, but it may be unnecessarily degrading. As such, the question as to whether the
father's conduct is lawful punishment or unlawfully degrading is a subjective one that should be
determined by the finder of fact. Thus, the defense should contemplate situations where no
physical injury was intended to flow from the parental discipline.
Second, while assault statutes address conduct resulting in injury to the victim, they also
encompass attempts to cause injury or conduct that places individuals at a substantial risk of
injury. An attempt to commit an assault generally will be characterized by an intent to engage in
the conduct that constitutes the crime and a substantial step towards the commission of the
crime. Then, for one reason or another the intended act is thwarted. Defining conduct as crimi-
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Finally, to address the fact that the defense must be versatile, the
statute should be one of general application pertaining to all crimes of
violence against children. This means that the defense should be con-
tained in a general justification statute rather than included within the
statutory language of specific crimes designed to protect children. A
single criminal statute that sets forth the defense will avoid the poten-
tial conflicting defense standards that could arise from multiple codifi-
cations and/or common-law interpretations. This approach will
provide consistency and clarity to the courts interpreting the defense
and to parents who assert that their disciplinary actions were lawful.3 39
With these goals in mind the following statute is proposed.
B. The Proposed Statute
The Use of Disciplinary Force3 40
The use of physical force upon a child, that would other-
wise constitute a criminal offense, is justifiable under the fol-
lowing conditions:
Force that does not result in physical injury may be used
by a parent for the purpose of discipline, control, or restraint of
a child, but only to the extent that such force does not place the
child at a substantial risk of either death, serious physical or
emotional injury, or gross degradation.
Definitions:
Child: A child is defined as an unemancipated minor.
Parent: A parent is defined as a biological or adoptive
parent, stepparent, or court-appointed guardian.341
nal because it places another at a "substantial risk of injury" may capture conduct amounting to
an attempt. It may, however, also address conduct that is negligent or reckless in nature. For
example, holding a child's head under water may pose a substantial risk for injury even if the
parent has no intention of drowning the child. Each of these contingencies explains why the
parental corporal punishment defense must address parental conduct that does not result in
physical injury to the child.
339. Even if a general justification statute is enacted, problems will still be posed by the
language of the underlying offense. For example, if the justification defense excludes conduct
that "grossly" degrades the child and the underlying offense makes it a crime to "unnecessarily"
degrade the child, the inconsistency in terms will not promote clarity.
340. Many statutes and case-law interpretations establishing the right to use disciplinary
force extend the defense to school personnel. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-605(1) (Michie
1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-3-107 (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:6(11) (1996). It is also
common to include mentally incapacitated adults within the definition of the child. Whether
school personnel and/or the mentally handicapped should be encompassed by the defense is an
issue beyond the scope of this article.
341. Traditionally, the right to use disciplinary force has been broadly extended to include
adults who have assumed responsibility for the welfare of the child. As such, this definition is
more restrictive than most statutory provisions or court interpretations of the privilege. It has
been drafted with the assumption that the right to use physical force to discipline children should
be limited to those with a specific legal relationship to the child. The factors supporting this
position include the social science research negating the positive benefits derived from corporal
punishment and the number of cases of child abuse involving "live-in" adults. See Zigler & Hall,
supra note 40, at 52 (indicating that approximately 17% of the cases of child abuse involve a live-
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Physical Injury: Physical injury is defined as any dam-
age to or impairment of tissue or organ, but does not include
transient red marks or temporary pain.342
Serious Physical Injury: Serious physical injury is de-
fined as protracted, permanent, or life-threatening trauma or
damage to tissue or organ.
Serious Emotional Injury: Serious emotional injury is
defined as a medically diagnosable mental condition, trauma,
or illness.
This statutory proposal adopts the universal features that are and
always have been reflected by the defense to the extent that it applies
to parents and children, and force used for a disciplinary purpose. In
a fashion similar to the Model Penal Code,34 3 it removes from consid-
eration by the fact finder the subjective elements of reasonableness
and necessity. Again mimicking the Model Penal Code, the statute
contemplates acts of aggression that have a nonphysical consequence
in that the defense does not extend to parental conduct that places a
child at a substantial risk of death, serious physical or emotional in-
jury, or gross degradation.344 Finally, the most significant difference
between this approach and the vast majority of statutes defining, or
court decisions interpreting, the defense is that the outside parameter
of physical punishment is clearly placed at the point of physical injury
to a child.
The statute's clear elimination of a parent's right to use discipli-
nary force resulting in physical injury to the child guides the logic be-
hind the remaining provisions. This limitation will provide significant
protection for the physical well-being of the child. Moreover, because
this protection is in place, the need to review the reasonableness of, or
necessity for, the imposed punishment becomes less compelling. As
such, the countervailing force of parental autonomy is strengthened.
The language of the second limitation, drawn from the Model Pe-
nal Code, is specifically included under the proposed statute to ad-
dress disciplinary conduct that does not result in a physical
consequence.345 This goal is accomplished by excluding application of
in partner of parent). As such, acceptable discipline, by those not meeting the definition of
parent, should be limited to nonphysically aggressive techniques.
342. This definition of physical injury is meant to capture bruising, lacerations, burns, frac-
tures, or internal injuries. It is not intended to include fleeting pain or red marks that are tempo-
rary. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.A.16.100 (West 1988).
343. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08 (1985).
344. Although the language is borrowed from the Model Penal Code, jurisdictions following
the reasonable moderate approach may also exclude conduct that creates a substantial risk of
the enumerated factors. Parental discipline that creates substantial risks to the child are gener-
ally not determined to be reasonable. See, e.g., State v. Leaf, 623 A.2d 1329, 1331 (N.H. 1993).
345. It should be noted that although the language of the second limitation is drawn from
the Model Penal Code, the practical effect is different. Under the Model Penal Code there is no
prohibition against the infliction of physical injury. There, the only limitation is against conduct
that causes or creates a substantial risk of serious injury. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08 (1985).
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the defense when the parent places the child at substantial risk of
death, serious physical or emotional injury, or gross degradation. The
second prong addresses three situations.
The language of the proposed statute excluding parental conduct
that places the child at a substantial risk of gross degradation is in-
cluded to address conduct damaging to the emotional well-being of
the child, as well as conduct that violates community standards of de-
cency-the types of parental conduct commonly made criminal by the
crime of child abuse. It could be argued that conduct placing the child
at risk for gross degradation would, by definition, place the child at
risk for serious emotional injury. Thus, precluding both types of con-
duct is redundant. It is, however, possible that parental conduct not
resulting in a medically diagnosable emotional injury could neverthe-
less be offensive to the values of the culture. It should also be noted
that the phrase "gross degradation" is left undefined. Because of the
subjective nature of the term "degradation," and the fact that it is so
dependent upon community standards, logic dictates that the fact
finder resolve the issue on a case-by-case basis. Although admittedly
this injects subjectivity into the evaluation of parental conduct, it
would seem to be a valid approach to resolving issues that do not have
a physical impact on the child.
The inclusion of a requirement that the parental conduct not
place the child at a substantial risk of serious emotional injury is of
extreme importance, particularly because the statute does not contain
a requirement that the punishment be reasonable or necessary. For
example, assume that a small boy is kept locked in a bedroom every
night for a period of five years as punishment for stealing food.34 6
Parents charged with child abuse could assert that the force used to
detain the boy was imposed for a disciplinary purpose. Because the
proposed statute eliminates the assessment of necessity and reasona-
bleness, such parental conduct would be protected unless the factor of
emotional injury is at issue. This points to the conclusion that when
reasonableness and necessity are not included as defense criteria, the
emotional aspects of a child's well-being must be contemplated in
framing the defense.
Finally, the third basis for denying application of the proposed
defense is that a parent must not place the child at a substantial risk of
serious physical injury. This provision is frequently included in cur-
rent codifications of the defense.3 4 7 It is an important provision to
The net effect is that under the Model Penal Code, this language affects conduct with and with-
out a physical consequence. Because physical injury is specifically excluded under the proposed
statute, the language will be applicable to those situations where no physical consequence
results.
346. See State v. Crowdell, 487 N.W.2d 273 (Neb. 1992).
347. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 563.061 (1994); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 509 (1994); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 3.08.
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include because it captures conduct that is neither degrading nor emo-
tionally damaging to the child but instead represents a failed attempt
to cause harm to the child or reckless conduct that is socially unac-
ceptable. For example, consider the situation where a stepfather
points a .44 caliber magnum at his three-year-old child and tells her to
stop crying or he will shoot.3 4 8 Whether the gun goes off or not, the
conduct could be deemed to have placed the child at a substantial risk
of serious physical injury. Thus, even if the child is not harmed emo-
tionally or physically, the proposed statute recognizes that society has
an interest in protecting children from conduct that is so fraught with
potential for injury.
In summary, the statute is designed to protect children from phys-
ical and emotional abuse. It is also intended to place outside the de-
fense conduct that rises to the level of socially unacceptable and
shocking behavior. To the greatest extent possible, invasion into pa-
rental decisions is limited in that actions not resulting in physical in-
jury will be less subject to question. This is accomplished in two ways.
First, conduct not resulting in a physical consequence must place
the child at a "substantial risk" for one of the listed factors. The use
of the word "substantial" should capture conduct that is probable or
expected rather than that which is a remote possibility. This is espe-
cially important with respect to conduct that is emotionally harmful or
degrading. Because many common parental actions may have a some-
what demeaning effect or an emotional consequence, the risk that
harm will flow from the conduct should be substantial in nature.
Second, when conduct does not result in physical injury, it must
rise to the level of a "serious" or "gross" deviation from accepted be-
havior. This higher level of tolerance in the nonphysical context is
acceptable because the language is meant to address consequences
that are subjective by nature and because the physical well-being of
the child is protected.
C. Anticipated Effect
The practical implications for parents who are prosecuted for us-
ing force against their children can best be analyzed by examining the
proposed defense as it would apply to several types of crimes. Con-
sider first, the least serious classification of assaults, those addressing
conduct that is offensive or that places another in apprehension of
serious bodily harm. Clearly, parents would be able to assert the pro-
posed defense whenever their conduct fell within the scope of these
348. See Duckworth v. State, 594 A.2d 109 (Md. Ct. App. 1991). In Duckworth, the defend-
ant actually shot the child who was hit by 50 pellets, some of which lodged in her heart. The
defendant conceded that he told her to stop crying or he would shoot her, but maintained that
the gun went off accidently. See id. at 111. The court indicated that there was sufficient evidence
for the jury to determine that the weapon was pointed at the child in order to make her stop
crying. See id. at 114-15.
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assault statutes because it would have no physical consequence. As
the proposed statute indicates that inflicting physical injury is not pro-
tected by the defense, it necessarily follows that something less than
physical injury is included within the protection offered. Thus, parents
who swat a child on the posterior, grab their cheeks, slap a hand (ac-
tions that would likely be deemed offensive contact if the victim were
an adult), or assert a threat to "tan your hide" (an action that could be
treated as a threat to inflict serious injury) could successfully assert
the defense. This type of conduct would be protected because it does
not result in physical injury and because it does not place the child at a
substantial risk for either a serious or gross consequence.
With respect to these minor misdemeanor assaults, arguably the
proposed statute more greatly respects parental autonomy than those
jurisdictions using the reasonable and moderate approach. This pa-
rental deference results because the fact finder is not asked to evalu-
ate either the reasonableness of, or necessity for, the punishment. In
terms of practical effect on individual defendants, the proposed ap-
proach would result in little change from the current status of the law,
no matter what the approach, because the defense would continue to
insulate conduct that is moderate and noninjurious.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the most serious category of
assaults are reserved for conduct that results in or places a person at
risk for serious physical injury. Again, under any current approach to
the corporal punishment defense, children have been protected from
conduct designed to result in injury that is either permanent, pro-
tracted, or life threatening.349 This form of discipline is either specifi-
cally excluded from the defense, as in the Model Penal Code,35° or has
been consistently found to be unreasonable or unnecessary in jurisdic-
tions relying on the reasonable and moderate approach. 351 Because
the proposed defense places physical injury outside the parameters of
the defense, serious injury will naturally be excluded as well.
The proposed statute will not result in a significant change at
either end of the spectrum of parental disciplinary conduct. It will,
however, have significant implications for parental conduct falling be-
tween these two poles. Middle-level assaults are generally aimed at
conduct that results in physical injury as opposed to serious physical
injury. The proposed statute will most directly impact this group of
assaults.
349. See infra Appendix. In several states the only form of discipline specifically excluded is
deadly force. See supra note 156.
350. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08.
351. See, e.g., LaPann v. State, 382 S.E.2d 200, 201 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (discussing convic-
tion of father who repeatedly struck child with a piece of firewood); Campbell v. Common-
wealth, 405 S.E.2d 1, 4-5 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming conviction of father who struck child
with belt).
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Under the proposed approach, a parent who causes physical in-
jury to his child will be unsuccessful in relying on the defense to pro-
tect his conduct. In comparison to the Model Penal Code approach,
parental latitude with respect to the degree of force that can be uti-
lized will be greatly curtailed. For example, a parent who caused se-
vere bruising to the buttocks of a child might be able to establish that
the force used was not designed to cause or known to create a sub-
stantial risk of serious physical injury to the child. Thus, under the
Model Penal Code approach, the parental conduct could be protected.
In contrast, under the proposed approach, the same injury would be
classified as physical injury, and therefore the parent could not rely on
the defense to prevent conviction.
In jurisdictions where the extent of acceptable punishment is un-
defined, the most significant impact of the proposed statute would be
to provide greater guidance to parents and fact finders with regard to
the range of acceptable parental discipline. Because the defense will
specifically exclude conduct resulting in physical injury, it again means
that parents will have less latitude with regard to the punishment im-
posed. As the law now stands, in the reasonable and moderate juris-
dictions, as well those that evaluate necessity, the fact finder could
evaluate the circumstances surrounding the punishment and find that
the infliction of the physical injury was reasonable or necessary, or
both. Although it might just as well find that it was neither, the issue
would at least be in controversy. Under the proposed approach, the
fact finder is always confronted with a threshold issue: was there
physical injury? If this question is resolved in the affirmative then the
defense is unavailable.
The practical implications for parents who are charged with child
abuse as opposed to assault are indistinguishable with respect to those
aspects of abuse statutes that address the physical well-being of the
child. With respect to those provisions of abuse statutes that deal with
the emotional well-being of the child (for example, provisions prohib-
iting degradation or cruel punishment), the question before the fact
finder will be whether the conduct placed the child at a substantial
risk for gross degradation or serious emotional injury.352 The lan-
guage used is very similar to that contained in the Model Penal Code
and, as such, will do little to change the current status of the law in
those states using this approach.35 3 In contrast to the reasonable/mod-
erate/necessary jurisdictions, the inclusion of the serious emotional in-
jury and gross degradation limitation is designed to replace a
subjective evaluation of the parental conduct (was it necessary or rea-
sonable) with a standard that addresses the direct impact on the child.
352. See discussion supra Part III.F.2.
353. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08, with discussion supra Part III.F.2.
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As applied, the proposed statute borrows and combines the best
features of current standards. The resulting framework will provide
more guidance to parents and greater protection for children. It will
yield greater autonomy for parents when their conduct does not result
in injury to the child. It will also provide greater protection for chil-
dren when parents use force with a physical consequence. Stated
otherwise, the proposed approach is preferable to the reasonable/
moderate/necessary approach because it gives specific guidance to
parents as to the limits of lawful disciplinary interaction with their
children. It also informs parents that nonphysically invasive discipline
will be protected unless it poses a substantial risk of serious or gross
harm to the well-being of the child. In contrast to the Model Penal
Code approach, the proposal will eliminate the protection for conduct
that causes a child to suffer physical injury. Thus, in comparison, the
proposed statute will clearly ratchet-down the level of acceptable
force currently tolerated in Model Penal Code jurisdictions.
VI. SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS
Although the anticipated practical effects of the proposal will be
to provide greater protection to individual children and more gui-
dance to parents and fact finders, it can be speculated that the most
profound impact of the statute may be an evolution of attitudes to-
ward the use of physical force to discipline. Moreover, it can be ar-
gued that a society less inclined to injure children in the name of
discipline would also be less inclined to tolerate child abuse. This is
precisely what happened in Sweden when the practice of corporal
punishment was legislatively addressed.
Between the period of 1965 and 1979, the Swedish government
took a progressively more active role in restricting a parent's right to
use corporal punishment to discipline their children.354 These efforts
culminated in 1979 when the Swedish Parliament enacted a law pre-
cluding the use of corporal punishment by parents. 355 The catalyst for
the governmental response to corporal punishment was, at least in
part, the rising incidence of child abuse in Sweden.356 One of the most
interesting aspects of the Swedish ban on corporal punishment is that
it was not enacted as part of the Swedish Criminal Code and violation
of the law does not include criminal sanctions. Instead, the Swedes
undertook substantial efforts to disseminate information designed to
assist parents in raising children without the use of corporal punish-
ment.357 In addition, the government used the public school system as
354. See Dennis Alan Olson, The Swedish Ban of Corporal Punishment, 1984 BYU L. REV.
447, 448-49.
355. See id. at 449.
356. See id. at 448.
357. See id. at 451-52.
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a vehicle to inform children that they could not be struck by their
parents.358
Recent studies of child abuse and the use of corporal punishment
in Sweden point to several interesting developments. First, public atti-
tudes toward corporal punishment have continued to steadily decline
since 1965. The first reported study, conducted in 1965, indicated that
fifty-three percent of Swedish adults considered corporal punishment
of children to be occasionally necessary.359 In 1968, the supporters of
corporal punishment had declined to forty-two percent, and by 1971,
only thirty-five percent of surveyed individuals continued to stand be-
hind the use of corporal punishment.36 ° In 1981, the number of sup-
porters had fallen to twenty-six percent.361 Most recently, a 1995
report indicates that only eleven percent of the Swedish population
supports the use of corporal punishment.362 Importantly, as the socie-
tal tolerance of corporal punishment has steadily declined in Sweden,
so has the rate of fatal child abuse. 36 3
In light of the cultural impact of the ban on corporal punishment
in Sweden, it could be suggested that a total ban on corporal punish-
ment would be preferable to the approach suggested above. There
are, however, several factors that suggest otherwise. First, the Swed-
ish government undertook a series of measures designed to curtail the
use of corporal punishment by parents. The initial measures began in
1965 and culminated with the ban fourteen years later in 1979. 364 It
can be argued that the process of molding attitudes was a gradual one,
and that as such, the Swedish public slowly became acclimated to
greater governmental restriction of the use of disciplinary force. Sec-
ond, public support for corporal punishment in this country far ex-
358. See id. at 454; Straus & Yodanis, supra note 53, at 65.
359. See Olson, supra note 354, at 449 (citing SWEDISH SAVE THE CHILDREN FED'N, CORPO-
RAL PUNISHMENT AND CHILD ABUSE 2 (A. Haeuser trans., 1981)).
360. See id. at 450.
361. See id. at 454.
362. See JOAN E. DURRANT & LINDA ROSE-KRASNOR, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT: RE-
SEARCH REVIEW AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 30 (1995).
363. For example, a study of trends in criminal homicide in Stockholm during the period of
1951-87, by Olof Wikstrom, indicated that overall homicide rates had generally risen during the
study period. However, with respect to the homicide of children by their parents, the peak
period was during the 1950s and 1960s. During the 1970s and 1980s, a downward trend is ob-
served, and during the period of 1985-87, there were no reported incidents of the homicide of a
child by their parents. See Olof H. Wikstrom, Context-specific Trends in Criminal Homicide in
Stockholm 1951-1987, 1 CRIME & CRIME PREVENTION 88, 93 (1992). A second study by So-
mander and Rammer evaluating the homicide of children in Sweden during the 1971-80 period
indicated that 96 children were homicide victims. While homicide rates in Sweden during this
time period generally increased, and the rates of child homicide attributable to a parental-
suicide-child-homicide incident remained stable, the number of children who died from fatal
child abuse declined. Specifically, during the final five-year period of the study (1981-85), no
deaths were attributable to child abuse. See Lis K.H. Somander & Lennart M. Rammer, Intra-
and Extrafamilial Child Homicide in Sweden 1971-1980, 15 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 45, 47-52
(1991).
364. See Olson, supra note 354, at 448-49.
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ceeds Swedish support at its zenith. As mentioned above, public
support for corporal punishment of children in the United States is
more likely to fall in the ninety percent range,365 as opposed to the
fifty-three percent maximum known approval rate in Sweden. 366
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the United States has a
long legal history emanating from the English common law that sup-
ports the use of corporal punishment and dissuades unnecessary inter-
ference in matters of family autonomy. Although the original
codification of Swedish family law authorized the use of corporal pun-
ishment by parents, by 1949 the legislature had begun to question
whether parents should have the right to "punish," and by 1957 the
ability to assert the corporal punishment privilege as a defense in
criminal actions was eliminated.367 Each of these factors support the
proposition that although the Swedish model is one that many child
advocates would support, the political, social, and legal climate in this
country may be less receptive to an outright ban of corporal punish-
ment. The proposed statutory framework, however, could be viewed
as a reasonable first step leading to a society that is less tolerant of
child abuse.
A second societal impact to be derived from the proposed de-
fense is that prosecutors may have greater guidance as to when crimi-
nal prosecution is and is not appropriate in cases involving the
disciplinary use of force. Whether the criminal justice system is an
appropriate mechanism for addressing the child abuse crisis is a mat-
ter subject to controversy.368 However, within the context of abuse
that arises from the use of disciplinary force, the decision to seek pros-
ecution or not should be made upon the standard factors utilized in
365. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
366. See supra note 359 and accompanying text.
367. See Olson, supra note 354, at 448.
368. See Douglas J. Besharov, Child Abuse: Arrest and Prosecution Decision-Making, 24
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 315 (1987). Many experts believe that the solution to the child abuse crisis
lies in providing adequate resources to social service agencies who intervene in families where
children have been abused. The proponents of the social service approach often contend that the
prosecution of parents who abuse their children is destructive to the family unit, does little to
provide treatment to offenders, and may deter parents from seeking medical treatment for in-
jured children. See id. at 318-19. In response to these contentions, Besharov suggests that the
criminal justice system may offer some significant advantages over intervention by social service
agencies. See id. at 319-24. In support of this argument, he points out that it has been estimated
that in up to 40% of the cases involving substantiated abuse, parents have significant personality
problems that are unreceptive to typical social service treatment plans. See id. at 319. Addition-
ally, he reasons that even in well-funded social service projects, statistics indicate that abuse
recidivism occurs in approximately 50% of the families who are in treatment. See id. Finally, he
suggests that the standard practice of social service agencies in removing the child from the
home and placing them in what often turns into long-term foster care may be as disruptive to
family unity as the alternative of criminal prosecution. See id. at 318. These factors, among
others, cause Besharov to suggest that the criminal justice system may offer significant benefits
over the traditional social service approach to child abuse. See id. at 319-24.
No. 2]
HeinOnline  -- 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 479 1998
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
prosecutorial decision making,369 rather than the lack of clarity with
respect to a potential defense that could be asserted by a parent.
For example, assume that a father beats his six-year-old boy with
an extension cord for making what he perceived to be sexual advances
toward the boy's two-year-old sister. Further, assume that the injuries
inflicted caused long-lasting, multiple bruises on the child's back and
bottom.37 ° In jurisdictions using the reasonable/moderate/necessary
standard, the prosecutor can only speculate as to whether the jury
would find that the punishment was reasonable or necessary.
Although the imposed punishment is harsh, the misconduct of the
child is controversial. As such, it becomes difficult to anticipate the
likely perspective of the fact finder. Because prosecutorial resources
are limited and the potential outcome is questionable, the prosecutor
may well refrain from seeking prosecution. Applying the same hypo-
thetical in Model Penal Code jurisdictions, it is less likely that the
prosecutor would proceed with prosecution. Because the child did not
suffer permanent injury or disfigurement, the defense would apply un-
less the jury found that the parental conduct placed the child at a sub-
stantial risk for serious injury. Thus, even though the subjective
elements of reasonableness and necessity are removed from the
Model Penal Code approach, the high threshold of force authorized
by the defense would again serve as a deterrent to prosecution.
Finally, applying the hypothetical to the suggested proposal, the
prosecutor would evaluate the threshold question of whether physical
injury was inflicted. Because the injury inflicted falls within the pro-
posed definition of physical injury, the father's conduct would not be
protected by the defense. Consequently, the clarity of the proposed
defense would facilitate prosecution if the case was otherwise suitable
for prosecution.37'
369. The American Bar Association has suggested the following factors as typical issues to
consider in the process of pursuing criminal prosecution: (1) whether the prosecutor believes
that the defendant is guilty; (2) the degree of harm caused by the crime; (3) the disproportion of
the punishment in relation to the offense; (4) improper motivation by a complaining party; (5)
reluctance of victim to testify; (6) cooperation of the defendant in other potential criminal prose-
cutions; and (7) whether prosecution by a second jurisdiction is anticipated. AMERiCAN BAR
AsS'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION
ch. 3, § 3.9(b) (2d ed. 1979).
370. See State v. Nevels, 609 S.W.2d 725 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). The disciplinary action taken
by the defendant in this case arose because the six-year-old victim was alleged to have been
involved in sexual play with his two-year-old sister, and he had failed to learn his ABCs. See id.
at 726. Tragically, the hypothetical posed does not include a complete rendition of the force
used by the defendant. Additionally, the child's head was held under water, he was thrown
across a room, and stomped in the stomach. See id. The autopsy performed on the victim indi-
cated that the child died as the result of numerous internal injuries and bleeding in the brain.
See id. at 725-26.
371. It is true that in cases involving conduct that does not result in physical injury, subjec-
tive concerns presented by the proposed defense would continue to be factored into the prosecu-
tor's decision to pursue criminal charges. When criminal laws encompass conduct that does not
have a physical consequence, a subjective issue always come into play. This would appear to be
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The importance of this clarity cannot be understated. If the hy-
pothesis that current standards used to define the defense are an im-
pediment to prosecution is correct, then the quickly following
assumption is that many parents who abuse their children are not held
accountable for their conduct. It has been estimated that approxi-
mately five percent of the instances of child abuse result in criminal
prosecution.372 Although the reasons for this phenomenon are com-
plex, it is not far-fetched to speculate that the corporal punishment
defense is a contributing factor.
The immediate goal of the proposed statute is to provide a legal
framework that strikes a balance between the continuing viability of
the parental defense while simultaneously providing a clear statutory
prohibition against force that results in injury. The statute has been
drafted to include components that appeal to supporters and detrac-
tors of the practice of using corporal punishment. Less assessment of
why and how a punishment is imposed has been balanced against a
clear prohibition against physical injury. It is hoped that such a bal-
ance will result in a politically appealing alternative to current statu-
tory schemes.
The process of suggesting a politically acceptable solution is only
the most immediate of the intended goals of the proposed statute. It
is also anticipated that if adopted, the proposed statute will nudge so-
cietal attitudes on the value of using corporal punishment to teach the
concepts of right from wrong. That is to say, if society condemns disci-
pline that results in injury then a clear statement has been made that
discipline and harm are no longer compatible concepts. Although
wishful thinking may be afoot, it can be hoped that, whatever the con-
tours of the ensuing debate, a society less tolerant of child abuse will
emerge. Although the complexity of the child abuse phenomena can
seem insurmountable, a statutory proposal that places its focus on
protecting the physical integrity of children is a cost-effective and sen-
sible first step.
VII. CONCLUSION
Research of this nature cannot be undertaken without becoming
keenly aware of the fact that parental acts of aggression can assume
heinous dimensions that shock the conscience and burden the soul.
The reported cases tell us that in the name of discipline children are
an unavoidable consequence of punishing conduct that offends human decency, is grossly de-
grading, or has a serious impact on the emotional well-being of the child.
372. See Besharov, supra note 368, at 359 (citing U.S. NAT'L CTR. ON CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT, NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT REPORTING (1978)
36 tbl.28 (DHEW 1979)); see also Delbert S. Elliott, Criminal Justice Procedures in Family Vio-
lence Crimes, in 11 FAM. VIOLENCE 427, 459 (Lloyd Oblin & Michael Tonry eds., 1989).
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beaten with belts,373 electrical cords,374 sticks,375 coat hangers,376
bats,377 and studded weapons.378 They are locked in rooms without
food or heat and forced to carry excrement 379 or to eat urine-soaked
food.3 8 ° They have plastic bags placed over their heads,381 are
knocked into walls,382 are scalded,383 or emersed in freezing water.384
They are forced to drink water until they die,385 or they are beaten
until they jump from windows to their death.386 They are injured,
they are scarred, and they die.
Some might suggest that the defense is working as it should be-
cause most of these parents have been brought to justice. Others
would contend that these cases are abhorrent aberrations. It could
even be speculated that it is the pernicious ingenuity of certain paren-
tal discipline that engenders our concern. If this perspective is as-
sumed, two questions must be posed. How do we explain the
staggering number of reported cases of abuse, many of which have
suspected origins in the use of disciplinary force? And most impor-
tantly, would parents so frequently abuse their children if society
clearly prohibited their physical injury?
If the parental force defense plays any role at all in the abuse of
children then logic dictates that the issue of how much discipline is too
much must be reexamined. In the course of that examination it is
clear that the physical and emotional well-being of children must be
protected. At the same time, the right of parents to discipline children
and raise them as they see fit cannot be ignored.
373. See, e.g., Herbert v. State, 526 So. 2d 709, 710 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Kama v.
Florida, 507 So. 2d 154, 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Bowers v. Maryland, 389 A.2d 341, 343
(Md. 1978); State v. Leaf, 623 A.2d 1329, 1330 (N.H. 1993); People v. Franklin, 433 N.Y.S.2d 482,
483 (App. Div. 1980) (reversing defendant's conviction); Teubner v. State, 742 S.W.2d 57, 58
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Campbell v. Commonwealth, 405 S.E.2d 1. 3 (Va. Ct. App. 1991); Keser v.
State, 706 P.2d 263, 265 (Wyo. 1985).
374. See, e.g., Lowery v. State, 641 So. 2d 489, 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); People v.
Johnson, 479 N.E.2d 481, 483-84 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); People v. Reynolds, 415 N.E.2d 685, 687-88
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980); People v. Lee, 405 N.E.2d 860, 863 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
375. See, e.g., People v. Waiters, 570 N.E.2d 6, 6 (I. App. Ct. 1991); Commonwealth v.
Krammer, 371 A.2d 1008, 1009 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977); State v. Singleton, 705 P.2d 825, 826 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1985).
376. See Stoker v. Commonwealth, 828 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Ky. 1992).
377. See, e.g., State v. Sambo, 554 N.E.2d 1080, 1082-83 (I11. App. Ct. 1990); State v. Rivera,
337 A.2d 385, 386 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
378. See State v. Killory, 243 N.W.2d 475, 478 (Wis. 1976).
379. See State v. Crowdell, 487 N.W.2d 273, 276-77 (Neb. 1992).
380. See State v. Rucker, 459 S.E.2d 858, 859 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995).
381. See United States v. Gowadia, 34 M.J. 714, 715 (A.C.M.R. 1992).
382. See Commonwealth v. Ogin, 540 A.2d 549, 551 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
383. See People v. Lawrence, 297 P.2d 144, 145 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
384. See Commonwealth v. Rochon, 581 A.2d 239, 241 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
385. See State v. Crawford, 406 S.E.2d 579 (N.C. 1991); State v. West, 404 S.E.2d 191, 193-94
(N.C. Ct. App. 1991). The defendants maintained that the water was administered for a medical
reason. See Crawford, 406 S.E.2d at 583. It was the state's contention that the water was admin-
istered as a disciplinary measure. See id. at 582-83.
386. See People v. Parker, 414 N.E.2d 190, 191-92 (Il1. App. Ct. 1980).
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The balance sought by the proposed statute seeks to recognize
both factors. By removing the question of reasonableness and neces-
sity from the consideration of the fact finder, parental autonomy is not
only maintained, but enhanced. By refusing to condone conduct that
places a child at risk for serious emotional injury and limiting accepta-
ble physical interaction to that which does not result in physical injury,
the well-being of the child is protected. Simply stated, there is less
reason to question the reasonableness or the necessity for disciplinary
punishment if the physical and emotional well-being of the child is
sacrosanct.
Any human that has ever parented a child recognizes why the
reluctance to set a bright line has been so long lasting and so preva-
lent. Raising children has never been easy. The recognition that loss
of patience, temper, and restraint is a frequent occurrence in family
life is universally accepted. With just this thought in mind, some may
think the proposed statute casts too wide a net-that loving parents
will be subjected to criminal castigation for a moment of ineffective
parenting.
Although the likelihood of this contingency seems remote, it is
impossible to know how judges and juries will interpret a particular
statutory proposal, and clearly this statute will decrease the degree of
force that is lawful in most jurisdictions. Yet, in the final analysis, the
proposal simply says that in the process of teaching children right
from wrong, parents must not grossly degrade, inflict physical injury
upon, or subject to serious emotional harm the children entrusted to
their care.
It is expected and intended that a standard that delineates crime
and punishment in this fashion will require parents to discipline their
children with greater restraint; all in all, a small price to pay for a
society whose children have been shaped by a gentle hand.
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